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 Abstract  
 
Why do many developed countries continuously provide foreign assistance to 
developing countries? Questioning how the international norm of foreign 
assistance is preserved and has become a tangible policy in donor countries, this 
paper presents a theory of domestic support for foreign aid in the U.S. by focusing 
on the role played by aid contractors or development firms in domestic politics. 
Development firms, the real implementer of foreign aid projects, actively lobby 
legislators and disseminate information, which leads to the maintenance and 
expansion of foreign aid in a donor country. This paper argues that this special 
interest group of development firms plays a significant role in facilitating 
legislators’ continuing support for foreign aid policies. By focusing on the domestic 
dynamics of the United States, this paper examines a circular principal-agent (PA) 
relationship between the three groups of key actors in the politics of foreign aid: 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
development firms, and the legislators. 
Many extant researches explain this puzzle of foreign aid through country-
level analysis. These studies perceive foreign aid as a diplomatic tool employed for 
aid-giving countries’ own political, strategic and economic interests. More recent 
literature expounds the political economy of foreign aid at a domestic level. These 
studies show how dynamics among domestic actors within a donor country affect 
foreign aid policies. I sought to advance the literature of the political economy of 
foreign aid by probing the roles of the private development firms and NGOs. This 
paper particularly focuses on the political dynamics of the domestic actors in the 
United States, the leading donor country. 
 ii 
This paper explores the roles of development firms in diffusing and 
executing international norms of foreign aid. When USAID implements foreign 
assistance programs, it contracts with private development firms or NGOs. They 
form a special interest group that has a strong preference for pro-foreign-aid 
policies, because foreign aid is an important source of finance. This paper 
suggests that as the amount of contracts allocated within a congressional district 
increases, the legislator in the district is more likely to support pro-foreign-aid 
policies. Furthermore, these aid contractors play a critical role in the principal-
agent relationship between legislators and USAID by disseminating information 
to legislators through lobbying. Analyzing district-level contract data and firm-
level lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I discuss that (1) lobby 
contacts by major U.S. aid contractors increase the frequency of sponsorship for 
pro-foreign-aid bills and (2) the district-level allocation of contracts is positively 
associated with the frequency of sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
“[International] cooperation is a continuation of domestic 
political struggles by other means.” 
-Helen V. Milner (1997)1- 
 
“All politics is local.”2 Certainly, international politics is not an exception. All 
foreign policies need domestic support.3 Overturning Waltz (1979)’s assumption of 
a state being a unitary actor, many scholars have emphasized that international 
relations and domestic politics are indivisibly interdependent (e.g. Putnam 1988; 
Milner 1997; Fearon 1998).4 According to these scholars, a foreign policy is a 
 
1  Milner, Helen V., 1997, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations, Princeton University Press, p. 10. 
2 It is a quote frequently used in American Politics. A former house speaker, Tip O’Neil used to 
say this phrase during the 1930s. This means that constituents vote for those who pursue 
interests of the local. Therefore, priority of politicians is always at his own district. 
3 Need for domestic support for implementing a foreign policy is not limited to democratic 
countries. Even autocratic governments need domestic support for foreign policies. It is just 
that the degree of the support required for autocracy is lower than democracy. Milner (1998, 
p. 12) discusses that even in nondemocratic system, dictators still need “the support of the 
professional military, the landed oligarchy, big business, and/or a political party” to maintain 
their power and execute their policies. 
4 To briefly explain, realism (Krasner 1978; Waltz 1979) assumes that states are unitary actors in 
an anarchic environment. According to their view, states are hierarchically organized. 
Therefore, it neglects domestic factors which might affect decisions on foreign policies. 
Realists have a critical weak point that it is not able to explain a long-term international 
cooperation. More recent studies relaxed this assumption and examines domestic factors that 
affect foreign policies. Instead of hierarchically organized state, these studies claim that states 
are more of polyarchy where multiple decision-makers with different preferences over 
foreign policies exist in one state. More detailed information on realists’ view may be found 
in Waltz’s Theory of International Politics, and recent academic movement related to 
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result of struggles of multiple domestic-political actors whose preferences are 
different. Alongside with these researches, this paper explores how the dynamics of 
domestic politics affect foreign policy. More specifically, this thesis examines the 
roles of domestic interest groups in promoting international norm and cooperation 
in international development arena. 
Many existing researches that investigate international politics through the 
prism of domestic politics deal with foreign policies in domestically salient issues.5 
These foreign policies, which are usually related to military, strategic and 
economic issues, yield distributional as well as electoral consequences 
domestically; hence, there is some degree of demand from political leaders to 
cooperate with other countries. These studies explain that political dynamics 
among political elites -mostly executive and legislative branches- result in a 
particular foreign policy. 
Interestingly, foreign aid policies, which have a weak constituent base and 
low salience level in donor countries, have been the key instruments of maintaining 
international cooperation in the international development field.6 According to 
 
interplay between international and domestic politics can be studied in Milner (1997)’s 
Interests, Institutions and Information, and Putnam (1988)’s Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics.  
5 Fearon (1998) well summarized the related literature: “Bueno de Mesquita & Lalman (1992) on 
interstate war; Huth (1996) on territorial disputes; Peterson (1996) on crisis bargaining; 
Milner (1997), O’Halloran (1994), and Verdier (1994) on trade policy; Downs & Rocke 
(1995) on compliance and international cooperation; Evans et al (1993) on “two-level games”; 
Russett (1993) on democracy and war; Snyder (1991) on great power expansionism; Stamm 
(1996) on war outcomes; Kier (1997) and Legro (1995) on military doctrine; and the 
contributors to Rosecrance & Stein (1993) on grand strategy.” 
6 It will be explained in a more detailed manner in the latter part of this paper. To briefly explain, 
while the beneficiaries of foreign aid are abroad, the source of the budget comes from 
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Milner(1997, p. 48)’s categorization, foreign aid policy falls into a category where 
there is only “low demand for cooperation from political leaders.”7 It is a puzzle 
that international cooperation in this arena has been continued and highly 
institutionalized though political leaders who have low incentives to provide 
foreign aid to developing countries.8 In 2000, all member states of United Nations 
(UN) adopted the United Nations Millennium Declaration, more well-known as 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which was developed into Sustainable 
 
constituents of donor countries. As foreign aid from donor countries become source of 
funding for international organizations in development arena, foreign aid has become an end 
itself. 
7 Milner, Helen V., 1997, pp. 47~59. 
 Low Externalities* High Externalities 
High Home Benefits** No/least demand Some demand 
Low Home Benefits Little demand Most demand 
“Table 2.1 The Demand for International Cooperation” in Milner (1997, p. 48) 
* Externalities: costs that a country has to bear when other countries use a policy unilaterally 
without cooperation. 
** Home Benefits: benefits that a country gains from unilateral use of a policy. 
Categorization for foreign aid policies: When other donor countries use of foreign aid policies, 
they do not create any significant cost at home (except the period during the Cold War). 
Therefore, it has low externalities. With home benefits, unilateral use of foreign aid may 
bring some benefits in a way; however, use of other foreign aid policies may be more 
beneficial, because foreign aid policies usually induce indirect benefits to donor countries. 
Therefore, foreign aid policy may lie between high and low home benefits. Regardless of 
home benefits, the demand of political leaders for cooperation in this issue area is little. 
8 During the Cold War, the increase in foreign aid was understandable as it was used as a 
diplomatic tool, which the United States and Soviet Union competitively employed to make 
an ally of developing countries. Therefore, Realists expected foreign aid to decline after the 
Cold War (Morgenthau 1962; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor 1998). However, though it showed 
declining trend during the mid-1990s, it has been recovered and increased rapidly since early 
2000s (see Appendix A). 
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Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015. International Organizations such as United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and OECD DAC are main international 
organizations run by foreign aid funding from donor countries.9 
Alongside academic efforts of interweaving international and domestic 
politics, this thesis explores the aforementioned puzzle by exploring the roles 
played by interest groups. The existing studies mostly focus on the relationship 
between the legislative and executive branches when they explain how a foreign 
policy is formed in the midst of domestic-political dynamics. They do mention the 
importance of interest groups as an information disseminator; but they do not fully 
explicate the significance and unique roles of interest groups. As Keck and Sikkink 
(1998) pinpoint in their book, studies of interest groups were underdeveloped in 
political science, especially in study of international politics, despite their critical 
role in international cooperation.10 This paper will contribute to the literature of 
interplay between international and domestic politics by investigating the roles of 
interest groups, which form transnational as well as domestic networks.  
 
1. Research Question 
Foreign aid is known as government spending on non-citizens. 11  While the 
 
9 In this paper, the words, aid, foreign aid, foreign assistance, and official development assistance 
(ODA), are used interchangeably. According to OECD.org, “ODA is defined as government 
aid designed to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”  
10 Keck and Sikkink (1998) do not use the word, “interest group.” Instead, they used words such 
as, advocacy networks, nonstate actors or activists. In this sentence, the word, ‘interest group’, 
is used for consistency; Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink, 1998, Activists Beyond 
borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Cornell University Press, pp. 1~4. 
11  박종희, 2016, “국제개발협력의 기원과 구조적 변화”,『개발협력의 세계정치』, 
사회평론, p. 107; Lundsgaarde, Erik, 2012, The Domestic Politics of Foreign Aid, Routledge, 
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beneficiaries of foreign aid are abroad, the source of the budget comes from 
constituents of donor countries. Mysteriously, though foreign aid has a weak 
constituency in donor countries, the budget for foreign aid has been maintained and 
continuously expanded in the long term.12 This means that there exists a political 
support for foreign aid policies and international norm of foreign assistance. This 
paper questions why political actors in donor countries appropriate a significant 
portion of their budget on foreign aid. I explore this question by focusing on the 
political dynamics of domestic actors in the largest donor country, the United 
States.13 As the U.S. is the leading donor country and a hegemonic power that has 
a strong agenda-setting power in international organizations, it is important to 
explore the domestic dynamics within the U.S. surrounding the foreign aid policies. 
Compared with other countries, the United States gives the largest amount 
of ODA. Within the United States, the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) is in charge of executing foreign aid policies, and received 
0.3 percent of government spending in 2017. The budget appropriated to USAID is 
the 22nd highest among 96 agencies. Considering that 0.37 percent and 0.32 
percent of total budget was appropriated for the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Commerce respectively, the amount that the USAID received is not 
 
p23; Snook, Stephen L., 1996, Principled Agents in an Agency Under Seige: USAID and its 
Mission in Tanzania, PhD thesis, Last updated: May 24 2016, https://search.proquest.com/ 
docview/ 304295703?accountid=6802, p. 51, (Last accessed May 19 2019). 
12 See Appendix A. Though there have been some periods of downturns, overall trend of ODA is 
increasing. 
13 The United States appropriated 35.26 billion dollars for the ODA in 2017, while the second 
biggest donor, Germany, appropriated 24.68billion. (refer to the second table in the website, 
Compare your country by OECD: http://www2.compareyourcountry.org/oda?cr=302&cr1 
=oecd&lg=en&page=0\# (Last accessed May 10 2019). 
 ６ 
so small. It is interesting that there is domestic-political support that allows foreign 
aid to be maintained despite the fact that foreign aid has a very weak constituent 
base. 
Recent political dynamics in the U.S. surrounding foreign aid are even more 
puzzling. Led by his campaign slogan, “America First,” President Donald Trump 
proposed 32 percent budget cuts for diplomacy and aid in 2017, and 24 percent for 
USAID in 2019.14 Though some legislators support the budget cuts, many other 
legislators strongly oppose the president’s proposal for foreign aid cut.15 In the end, 
the Congress responded with a bipartisan rejection and passed bills that enhance 
foreign aid.16 It is a puzzling phenomenon that legislators, who pursue the interests 
of the constituents in their districts, actively support aid for non-constituents. 
 
14 Sohngen, Tess, “These Members of Congress Are Saying ‘No’ to Foreign Aid Budget Cuts,” 
Global Citizen,  June 22 2017, https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/ congress-members-
oppose-trump-foreign-aid-funding/, (Last accessed May 17 2019); Davidson, Joe, “‘What an 
ugly picture this budget paints of America,’ the House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman 
said,” The Washington Post, April 12 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
2019/04/12/congress-scorns-trump-plan-cutweaponize-foreignaid/?utm_term=.0aa6b06685f8, 
(Last accessed May 17 2019). 
15 This phenomenon is debatable as Putnam (1988, p. 434) stated that “national governments 
seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of foreign developments.” In the case of Trump, he does not hesitate to 
cause any adverse effects to relationship with other countries to secure national interests. 
What is more interesting is that legislators actively pursue international cooperation, which 
seems not so related to the local interests. 
16 Schrayer, Liz, “Foreign Assistance in the ‘America First’ Era,” Brookings, July 31 2018, 
https:// www.brookings.edu/research/foreign-assistance-in-the-america-first-era/ (Last 
accessed May 17 2019); Matthews, Dylan, “Congress is Actually Working Together on 
Something: Reforming Foreign Aid,” Vox, Jan 15 2016, 
https://www.vox.com/2016/1/15/10772354/ congress-foreign-aid, (Last accessed May 19 
2019). 
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This paper examines political dynamics surrounding foreign aid to answer 
the question, “Why do legislators support foreign aid policies?” Exploring this 
question would not only help analyzing the legislators’ different preferences 
towards foreign aid policies, but also extend the literature of norm diffusion and 
enhance the understanding of international cooperation from the perspective of 
domestic politics. 
 
2. Argument and Method 
 
Figure I-1. Extant Principal-Agent Model vs. Circular Principal-Agent Model: extant 
literatures in political science usually employ one-way principal-agent models to explain 
political dynamics within a country. In order to explore how international development 
norm spreads to legislators, this thesis introduces a circular principal-agent model. This 
circular-structured delegation chain allows bipartisan support for pro-foreign-aid bills; 
hence, promoting international cooperation. 
 
As an answer of the research question suggested above, this thesis presents a theory 
of domestic support for foreign aid in the U.S. by focusing on the role played by 
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aid contractors or development firms in domestic politics.17 Development firms, 
the real implementer of foreign aid projects, form a portion of constituents in a 
congressional district. This paper discusses that this special interest group of 
development firms plays a significant role in facilitating legislators’ continuing 
support for foreign aid policies.18 By focusing on the domestic dynamics of the 
United States, this paper examines a circular principal-agent(PA) relationship 
between the three groups of key actors in the politics of foreign aid: legislators, the 
United States Agency for International Development(USAID) and the development 
firms. Developing extant one-way principal-agent model, this thesis employs a 
circular principal-agent model as illustrated in Figure I-1. 
When USAID implements foreign assistance programs, it contracts with 
private development firms or NGOs. They form a special interest group that has a 
strong preference for pro-foreign-aid policies, because foreign aid is an important 
source of finance. This paper suggests that as the amount of contracts allocated 
within a congressional district increases, the legislator in the district is more likely 
 
17 In this research, aid contractors and development firms/NGOs are referred to the same group. 
Aid contractors are defined as private for-profit firms and NGOs delegated by USAID which 
conduct foreign aid programs. Therefore, the terms, ‘aid contractors’ and ‘development firms’ 
are used interchangeably in this paper. Though NGOs are not a firm, which pursues its own 
profits, for the convenience of delivery, this paper assumes that NGOs are also part of 
development firms. Jean-Frédéric Morin (2010, p. 311)’s statement supports this idea: “It is 
now generally recognized that normative frameworks and instrumental objectives inform 
both advocacy and business networks, although at different levels. Moreover, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations use similar strategies to influence 
public policy: they overcome their competition to build coalitions, exchange information, and 
use a common rhetoric to frame public issues.” 
18 In this research, I use a broad definition of special interest group following Grossman and 
Helpman (2001). It is a subset of voters who have similar policy preferences, regardless of 
whether they have formed an organization or not. 
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to support pro-foreign-aid policies. Furthermore, these aid contractors play a 
critical role in the principal-agent relationship between legislators and USAID by 
disseminating information to legislators through lobbying. Analyzing district-level 
contract data and firm-level lobby data from the 111th to the 115th Congress, I 
discuss that (1) the district-level allocation of contracts is positively associated with 
the frequency of sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills and (2) lobby contacts by 
major U.S. aid contractors increase the frequency of sponsorship for pro-foreign-
aid bills.  
In order to test the two hypotheses, this paper employs both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. It utilizes academic journals, books, testimony records, news 
articles, reports from NGOs and development firms, and other Congressional 
records covering from the period of the Cold War to 2019 to explain the 
mechanisms of the two hypotheses. Furthermore, in order to conduct a statistical 
analysis, this thesis uses a time-series firm-level data provided by U.S. Federal 
Procurement Data System, district-level economic data and individual legislator’s 
ideology and pro-foreign-aid (co)sponsorship data, which cover the more recent 
period (2009-2017). 
 
3. Outlining Subsequent Chapters 
This section introduces following chapters of this thesis. Chapter 2 examines and 
summarizes previous literature which discusses motives behind foreign aid. It is 
largely divided into two perspectives according to their level of study: national 
level and district/individual-level. At the end of this chapter, it explains what 
contributions this thesis makes on top of existing studies. 
Chapter 3 provides theoretical frame for this thesis. First, it briefly 
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summarizes the studies that explore the interaction between international politics 
and domestic politics. This section shows the importance of domestic politics in 
explaining foreign policy outcomes. It also explains how the principal-agent model 
has been developed in political science. Then, it provides details of how this 
principal-agent model is modified into a circular principal-agent model for this 
research. This chapter introduces key actors in the model and describes how the 
relationships among these actors were formed and developed into a circular 
principal-agent relation. Moreover, two main hypotheses are suggested in this 
chapter. 
Chapter 4 investigates the two hypotheses empirically using individual-level 
legislators’ (co)sponsorship data, congressional level aid contract data and firm-
level lobby data. Details description of these data sets are provided in this chapter. 
Furthermore, it describes how these data sets are operationalized for this analysis. 
Results of empirical analysis are presented at the end of this chapter. 
Chapter 5 is conclusion of the thesis. It summarizes the main findings of this 
thesis. Furthermore, it displays contributions that complement extant researches 
and limitations. At the end, it provides some policy implications induced from the 
arguments in the thesis. 
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II. Motives Behind Foreign Aid: Literature Review 
 
Mixed and competing motives exist behind foreign aid. One of the most well-
known reasons of providing foreign aid is based on humanitarian grounds. From a 
moralistic perspective, foreign aid is an end itself; more developed countries are 
obliged to less developed countries. This norm of international development is 
institutionalized as the Millennium Development Goals agreed by 189 countries in 
September 2000 and later as the Sustainable Development Goals after 2015.19 
Foreign aid has become a basic tool that makes international norm into an actual 
program. 
Besides this moral motive behind foreign aid, academic researches analyze 
this puzzle from political perspectives. They explain this mystery behind motives 
for foreign aid through country-level analysis.20 These studies perceive foreign aid 
as a diplomatic tool for aid-giving countries’ own political, strategic and economic 
 
19 Other than MDGs or SDGs, many other international organizations and forums, such as UNDP, 
OECD DAC, and G20, uphold the norms of poverty reduction and international development. 
They are all institutionalized forms of international development norms.  
20 See Morgenthau, Hans, 1962, “A Political Theory of Foreign Aid,” American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 56, Issue 2, pp. 301~309; Maizels, Alfred and Machiko K. Nissanke, 1984, 
“Motivations for Aid to Developing Countries,” World Development, Vol. 12, Issue 9, pp. 
879~900; Meernik, James, Eric L. Krueger and Steven C Poe, 1998, “Testing Models of US 
Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid During and After the Cold War,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, 
Issue 1, pp. 63~85; Alesina, Alberto and David Dollar, 2000, “Who Gives Foreign Aid to 
Whom and Why?” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 5, Issue 1, pp. 33~63; Kuziemko, 
Ilyana and Eric Werker, 2006, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? Foreign 
Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114, Issue 5, pp. 
905~930; Stone, Randall W., 2004, “The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 98, Issue 4, pp. 577~591. 
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interests. More recent literature expounds the political economy of foreign aid at a 
domestic level.21 These studies show how dynamics among domestic actors within 
a donor country affect foreign aid policies. On top of these researches, I sought to 
advance the literature of the political economy of foreign aid by probing the roles 
of the private development firms/NGOs. Developing extant literature and 
scrutinizing the recent academic development of firm analysis based on the new 
new-trade theory, this paper argues that development firms diffuse and execute 
international norm of foreign aid. 
 
1. Foreign Aid as a Diplomatic Tool 
Many scholars in international politics have examined foreign aid at a national 
level. From this level of analysis, scholars usually explore the diplomatic use of 
foreign aid or characteristics of recipient countries in order to find strategic motives 
behind foreign aid. As a foreign policy, foreign aid is an instrument to pursue 
economic and political interests of donor countries; hence, the motive behind 
foreign aid is found in a donor’s interests. 
 
21 Fleck, Robert K. and Christopher Kilby, 2001, “Foreign Aid and Domestic Politics: Voting in 
Congress and the Allocation of USAID Contracts Across Congressional Districts,” Southern 
Economic Journal, pp. 598~617; Lancaster, Carol, 2008, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, 
Development, Domestic Politics, University of Chicago Press; Milner, Helen V. and Dustin H. 
Tingley, 2010, “The Political Economy of US Foreign Aid: American Legislators and the 
Domestic Politics of Aid,” Economics & Politics, Vol. 22, Issue 2, pp. 200~232; Powers, 
Ryan M., David A. Leblang and Michael J. Tierney, 2010, “Overseas Economic Aid or 
Domestic Electoral Assistance: The Political Economy of Foreign Aid Voting in the US 
Congress,” APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper; Hawkins, Darren G., David A. Lake, Daniel L. 
Nielson and Michael J. Tierney, 2006, Delegation and Agency in International Organizations, 
Cambridge University Press. 
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Foreign aid during the Cold War is widely understood in this realism 
perspective. During the Cold War, the United States and Soviet Union used foreign 
aid policies towards developing countries in order to expand their regional and 
ideological powers against one another.22 In this case, the motive behind foreign 
aid can be apprehended as a strategic tool for national interests. Hans Morgenthau 
(1962) may be the most prominent realist, who analyzes the diplomatic efficiency 
of foreign aid. He warns that economic foreign aid has dubious political impacts on 
the United States’ interests; therefore, foreign aid should be employed in a more 
careful and artistic manner. His statement indicates that from a realist view, foreign 
aid is a diplomatic instrument rather than a moral end. 
In a similar manner, some scholars explain how foreign aid is used as a bribe 
to developing countries. Questioning the continued support for foreign aid after the 
Cold War, they highlight the function of foreign aid as a bribe that buys the votes of 
developing countries. They explain that foreign aid is a political apparatus to gain 
support from developing countries in an international forum like the United 
Nations General Assembly.23 
This way of discerning foreign aid well describes how donors allocate aid 
among recipient countries. Though these researches partially explain the allocation 
of assistance to strategic countries, they still do not explain why the countries 
decide to support humanitarian foreign aid to strategically unimportant countries. 
 
22 Morgenthau, 1962; Meernik, Krueger and Poe, 1998; Maizelsand and Nissanke, 1984. 
23 Kuziemko, Ilyana and Eric Werker, 2006, “How Much Is a Seat on the Security Council Worth? 
Foreign Aid and Bribery at the United Nations,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 114. Issue 
5. pp. 905~930; Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp and Rainer Thiele, 2008, “Does US Aid 
Buy UN General Assembly Votes? A Disaggregated Analysis,” Public Choice, Vol.136, Issue 
1-2. pp. 139~164. 
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Furthermore, it does not fully explicate the variant stances of domestic actors. 
While some legislators support a pro-foreign-aid bill, others have rejected them. 
Some of legislators have even proposed an abolition of the USAID. This indicates 
a need to explore the domestic political dynamics within donor countries. 
 
2. Domestic Politics and Foreign Aid  
Extant studies that devote to grasp the domestic dynamics of political economy of 
foreign aid can be classified into two groups according to their focus of the study: 
public opinion, and political elites. 
Some political scientists claim that public opinion plays a significant role in 
promoting foreign aid. 24  Legislators, who struggle to be reelected, are 
correspondingly sensitive to constituents’ interests. In this public opinion literature, 
scholars perceive public opinion as an important factor that affects decision of 
legislators over bills related to foreign aid. 
However, apprehending that foreign aid is a less salient issue among the 
public, it is more important to scrutinize domestic actors who are more interested in 
foreign aid issue. This paper examines more important actors in foreign aid issue, 
development firms and NGOs the real actors who implement foreign aid programs. 
This research tackles roles played by these actors who contribute to the 
maintenance and expansion of foreign aid. 
Many extant literatures focus on decisions made by political elites, the 
executive government or the legislators. According to this perspective, decision on 
 
24 Milner, Helen V. and Dustin Tingley, 2013, “Public Opinion and Foreign Aid: A Review Essay,” 
International Interactions, Vol. 39, Issue 3, pp. 389~401; Heinrich, Tobias, Yoshiharu 
Kobayashi and Kristin A. Bryant, 2016, “Public Opinion and Foreign Aid Cuts in Economic 
Crises,” World Development, Vol.77, pp. 66~79. 
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supporting foreign aid is determined by the ideology of elites, or legislators.25 
Legislators approach foreign aid issues from their own moral stances, a pre-
established belief towards foreign aid. This statement assumes that foreign aid is a 
less salient issue to which constituents do not pay much attention. Hence, 
legislators decide direction of foreign aid policies according to their own 
preference, rather than their constituents’ (principals’) interests. 26  This paper 
explores how political dynamics among key actors related to foreign issue makes 
foreign aid issue more salient. 
  Similarly, some scholars connect ideology of legislators with 
partisanship.27 They claim that a left-wing party tends to prefer governmental 
intervention, which naturally leads to support for foreign aid. This partisan theory, 
however, does not fully explain the variance of supports for foreign aid within the 
same party. This paper tackles this argument by examining influence of interest 
group over legislators. 
Some studies suggest theory of foreign aid in terms of distributional effects 
of foreign aid across congressional districts. 28 Milner and Tingley (2010) argue 
 
25 Tingley, Dustin, 2010, “Donors and Domestic Politics: Political Influences on Foreign Aid 
Effort,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 50, Issue 1, pp. 40~49; Cronin, 
Patrick and Benjamin O. Fordham, 1999, “Timeless Principles or Today’s Fashion? Testing 
the Stability of the Linkage between Ideology and Foreign Policy in the Senate,” The Journal 
of Politics, Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 974~975. 
26 Peltzman, Sam, 1984, “Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting,” The Journal of Law 
and Economics, Vol. 27, Issue 1, pp. 181~210.  
27 Thérien, Jean-Philippe and Alain Noel, 2000, “Political Parties and Foreign Aid,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 94. Issue 1, pp. 151~162; Greene, Zachary D. and Amanda A. 
Licht, 2017, “Domestic Politics and Changes in Foreign Aid Allocation: The Role of Party 
Preferences,” Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 71, Issue 2, pp. 284~301. 
28 Miner and Tingley, 2010; Fleck and Kilby, 2001; Powers, Leblang and Tierney, 2010; Poirine, 
 １６ 
that legislators in the congressional districts with high human capitals tend to 
support foreign aid. According to their argument, most of the exporters are highly 
productive and require high human capitals. Foreign aid, which supports the 
development of trading partners, helps to promote trade between the donor and the 
recipient countries. Therefore, those legislators in congressional districts with high 
human capital are more likely to support pro-foreign-aid policies, which create 
distributional effects to their districts.29 
Recognizing distributional effects of foreign aid as a core motivation of 
legislators to support pro-foreign-aid bills, this paper explains it in a more direct 
way. This thesis argues that foreign aid creates distributional effects within the 
donor country, the U.S., as much of them return to domestic firms that execute 
foreign assistance programs. 
This research paper expands on the aforementioned academic efforts to 
advance the literature of international development in the political economy. 
Abreast of recent academic developments of firm-level analysis based on the new 
new-trade theory, I sought to further the literature of foreign aid by probing roles of 
special interest group through strategic actor-oriented approach. The institutional 
structure of foreign aid in the U.S., which leaves potential for aid-related interest 
groups to influence policies and even enhances their position, fosters support for 
pro-foreign-aid bills among legislators by creating distributive effects and 
promoting transmission of information among the key actors.   
 
Bernard, 1999, “A Theory of Aid as Trade with Special Reference to Small Islands,” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 47, Issue 4, pp. 831~852. 
29 Miner and Tingley, 2010; McLean, Elena V., 2015, “Multilateral Aid and Domestic Economic 
Interests,” International Organization, Vol. 69, Issue 1, pp. 97~130.  
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III. A Circular Principal-Agent Theory 
 
This section is devoted to build a theoretical frame for circular principal-agent 
model. In order to understand how principal-agent theory is related to international 
politics, this section starts with the issue of interaction between domestic and 
international politics. Then, it explains how principal-agent theory is developed in 
political science. In addition to general discussion of principal-agent theory, the 
third subsection of this chapter will introduce a circular principal-agent theory and 
how it is applied to the politics of foreign aid. At last, two main hypotheses and 
other important alternative hypotheses will be introduced. 
 
1. Theories of Domestic Politics Explaining Foreign Policies 
Domestic theories of international politics arise from attempts to overcome the 
limitation of realism. As Kenneth Waltz (1979) states in Theory of International 
Politics that international politics should be separated from politics, realists clearly 
detach international from domestic politics.30 He perceives a state as a unitary 
actor, packed in a “black box.” This reductionist assumption prevailed in studies of 
international relations (e.g. Morgenthau 1948; Carr 1946; Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; 
Mearsheimer 1990; Krasner 1991). 
However, some questions that are inexplicable with this state-centric theory 
rose and scholars recognized the importance of interaction between domestic 
politics and diplomacy.31 They criticize this assumption of unitary states as “a 
 
30  Waltz, Kenneth N., 1979, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Inc., pp. 38~39. 
31 One of the questions that are not explained by the state-centric theory is suggested by Keck 
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weak rationality assumption.”32 Overturning realists’ explanation of foreign policy, 
political scientists have endeavored to establish parsimonious theories that explain 
entanglement between domestic and international politics (e.g. Milner 1997, 
Fearon 1998, Putnam 1988, Katzenstein 1977).33 They emphasize that the state is 
not a unitary actor; thus, national preference is not fixed. It consists of groups with 
different preference, which means that there requires a theory of domestic politics 
that explore formation of national preferences. 
One of the scholars that tackle limitations of realism is Graham T. Allison 
(1971). Investigating Cuban missile crisis, he claims that understanding behavior of 
states as “the purposive acts of individuals” does not fully explicate governmental 
behavior. He states that the decisions made by a state is “a conglomerate of large 
organizations and political actors.”34 He drives foreign policy outcomes from 
 
and Sikkink (1998). They assert that the state-centric theory does not explain why states 
cooperate in issues, such as human rights and environmental issues; Though it is not limited 
to the post-Cold War period, domestic factor has become more emphasized after the Cold War. 
As McCormick and Wittkopf (1990, p. 1077) state, foreign policies after the Cold War shifted 
from the unified bipartisan nature to diverse political nature. They claim that “the bipartisan 
perspective, which says that politics stops at the water's edge, and the political perspective, 
which sees foreign policy as subject to the same partisan and ideological disputes that 
characterize domestic policy-making. The results demonstrate that the bipartisan perspective 
applies best to the Cold War years, and that the political perspective applies throughout the 
postwar era.” 
32 Moravcsik, Andrew, 1998, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht, Cornell University Press, p.23. 
33 For more reference, see Fearon, James D., 1998, “Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and 
Theories of International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, Issue 1, 
p306~307. 
34 Allison, Graham T., 1971, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Little, 
Brown and Company, p3. 
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debates among several different departments and key political actors, who possess 
different preferences and priorities. 
However, this literature partially explains interaction between domestic and 
international politics in a sense that its focus is on how domestic politics influence 
foreign policy outcomes. More researchers realized that it is important to study 
interaction between the domestic and international politics. Putnam (1988) 
formulates a two-level game as a tool for explaining international negotiations. It is 
called a two-level game because it deals with both national and international level 
analysis. At the national level, politicians need to embrace interest of domestic 
groups, while at the international level, the government has to find a way to satisfy 
domestic interests while “minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments.”35 Developing this two-level theory, Milner (1997) explained how 
international cooperation becomes possible. She explains how domestic actors’ 
preferences, political institutions and levels of information within a country affect 
international cooperation.  
It is understandable that most of researches that find linkage between 
domestic and international politics give prior attention to preferences and dynamics 
of political elites, mainly the legislative and the executive bodies. They are 
certainly important decision-makers in forming foreign policies. However, one 
should not forget that there are critical roles played by interest groups as well. 
Some scholars stress that in order to understand how international cooperation is 
possible in unpopular issues, roles of interest groups should not be exempted from 
the explanation (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Jean-Frédéric Morin 2010; Sell and 
Prakash 2004, Armstrong 1985). Keck and Sikkink (1998, p.203) state that “states 
 
35 Putnam, 1998, p.434. 
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have very few incentives to cooperate on these issues… Active intervention by a 
committed actor is necessary to get these issues onto political agendas.” Moreover, 
they explicitly assess the limitation of the two-level game suggested by Putnam:  
 
“however valuable its insights, even this two-way street [a two-level 
game] is too narrow, implying a limited access to the international that 
no longer holds true in many issue areas. Instead, we draw upon 
sociological traditions that focus on complex interactions among 
actors, on the intersubjective construction of frames of meaning, and 
on the negotiation and malleability of identities and interests.”36  
 
Indeed, there needs some more academic efforts to draw an attention to roles 
played by interest groups, who set unpopular issues on the political agenda and 
actually serve implementation of policies. 
Recognizing the importance of studying domestic politics in understanding 
international-political phenomenon, this thesis develops a theory of domestic 
support for foreign aid policies. Thus, among the two levels of study that Putnam 
suggests, this thesis focuses on national level process of foreign policy formation. 
Moreover, it draws attention to roles played by interest groups in forming foreign 
policies in promoting international cooperation and spreading international norm of 
foreign aid. 
 
2. Principal-Agent Theory in Political Science 
Agency theory, also referred to as the principal–agent (PA) model, is adapted from 
 
36 Keck and Sikkink, 1998, p. 4. 
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economics.37 PA model has been widely applied to explaining political dynamics 
among key actors, especially the relationships between voters-politicians and 
legislators-bureaucrats. 
For voters-legislators relationship Weingast (1984) states that voters are the 
ultimate principals of policymaking process in the U.S. and congressmen are their 
agents, who deliver interests of the voters. Extant studies have developed 
explanations about the voting behaviors of legislators by observing whether 
legislators decide policies based on their own preferences or their constituents’ 
interests.38 
Another relationship that are often explained by PA theory is the one 
between legislators and bureaucrats. Political scientists take bureaucratic agencies 
as agents of groups of political principals, such as Congress, the president, or 
courts.39 Bureaucratic agencies are delegated by politicians to deliver proper 
services to citizens. Among many political principals, legislators have a powerful 
tool to control bureaucrats: they appropriate the budget to each bureaucratic agency. 
 
37 Weingast, Barry R. and Mark J. Moran, 1983, “Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional 
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission,” Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 91, Issue 5, pp. 765~800; Weingast, Barry R., 1984, “The Congressional-
bureaucratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with applications to the SEC),” Public 
Choice, Vol. 44, Issue 1, pp.147~191; Peltzman, 1984; McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. 
Noll and Barry R. Weingast, 1987, “Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political 
Control,” Journla of Law, Economics, and Organization, Vol. 3, p. 243; Gailmard, Sean and 
John W. Patty, 2012, “Formal Models of Bureaucracy,” Annual Review of Political Science, 
Vol. 15, pp. 353~377. 
38 Bender, Bruce and John R. Lott, 1996, “Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of 
the Literature,” Public Choice, Vol. 87, Issue 1-2, pp. 67~100. 
39 Gailmard, Sean, 2014, “Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Public Accountability. 
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Weingast (1984) states that “because congressmen live and die by providing 
benefits to constituents, they have substantial incentives to tailor bureaucratic 
policies to suit their electoral needs.”40  
Bureaucrats live in a political environment as an agent that acts on behalf of 
Congress. In this hierarchical relationship, bureaucrats have to act strategically in 
order to survive and expand.41 Political scientists studying this PA relationship 
usually perceive this strategic behavior or bureaucratic agency as a problem. they 
underscore the problems of bureaucrats’ shirking and how to monitor them in order 
to deliver in accordance with interests of legislators and constituents. 
Developing this simple principal-agent model, some scholars explain that 
there is a chain of delegation among political actors. Nielson and Tierney (2003) 
explained how domestic politics within the U.S. promoted environment reform in 
World Bank through delegation chain among constituents, politicians, and 
international organizations.42 More advanced argument comes from Broz and 
Hawes (2006). They explain how banks in the U.S. become a key constituency for 
the IMF and lobby the U.S. government and legislators on behalf of IMF.43 This 
circular delegation chain helps to explain how political dynamics within a country 
promote international cooperation and enhance international organization. 
 
40 Weingast, 1984, p. 154. 
41 Van Belle, Douglas A., 2004, Media, Bureaucracies, and Foreign Aid: A Comparative Analysis 
of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France and Japan, Springer.  
42 Nielson, Daniel L. and Michael J. Tierney, 2003, “Delegation to International Organizations: 
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform,” International organization, Vol. 57, 
Issue 2, pp.241~276. 
43 Broz, J. Lawrence, and Michael B. Hawes, "US domestic politics and international monetary 
fund policy," in Hawkins, Darren G, David A Lake, Daniel L. Nielson and Michael J. Tierney 
(eds.), Delegation and agency in international organizations, Cambridge University Press. 
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Most of the extant studies, which utilize PA theory to explain political 
phenomena, focus on phenomena, such as informational asymmetry, adverse 
selection and agency’s shirking. 44  They perceive an agent pursuing its own 
interests instead of pursuing principal’s as a problem. However, this thesis does not 
perceive them as critical flaws in delegation chain. Rather, it explains how strategic 
behaviors of each agent helps promoting international norm of foreign aid. 
This paper modifies and utilizes principal-agent theory (PA theory) to 
explain the political dynamics among the main actors. It argues that a delegation 
chain among the key domestic actors in international development arena enhances 
support for foreign aid. Along with scholars who have examined how incentives of 
each political actor and informational asymmetry affect political behaviors, this 
paper pays attention to three types of PA theory in political science: legislators-
bureaucracy, voter-legislator and bureaucracy-special interest group relations. 
Modifying a typical one-way PA theory in political science, I introduce a circular 
PA theory to explore what roles interest groups play in spreading the norm of 







44 More detailed explanations for each conception can be found in Milgrom, Paul R., and John 
Donald Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization and Management, Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall. 
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3. A Circular PA Theory and Foreign Aid 
 
Figure III-1. A Circular Chain of Delegation: the figure explains how three key actors, 
Congress, USAID, and development firms, interact with one another through delegation 
process. It shows that this delegation chain forms a circular shape. Development firms are 
in a very unique position in this chain as they are agents of USAID as well as principals of 
legislators. 
 
This section introduces the institutional structure of U.S. foreign aid which can be 
summarized into a circular principal-agent relationship. Figure III-1 shows a 
circular PA relationship among three primary actors: legislators, USAID, and the 
development firms. Analyzing how these actors behave and interact, this research 
suggests that empowering the development firms by federal contracts has resulted 
in the political support of foreign aid in the U.S. 
Above all, it is necessary to define the three groups of actors presented in 
this circular PA model and each group’s interests. Congress, USAID and 
development firms are the key actors in the circular PA model as indicated in 
Figure III-1. They all have different interests and goals. It is crucial to examine 
each group’s interests, because this difference in interests leads to political 
dynamics among the actors, which ultimately directs to a foreign policy outcome. 
 ２５ 
In this paper, congress or legislators are referred to legislators in the U.S. 
House of Representatives.45 They are in control of appropriating budget for foreign 
aid programs and also in charge of monitoring activities of executive agencies. As a 
rational actor, legislators’ main goal is to be re-elected in next terms. In order to 
remain in the office, they pursue vote-maximizing policies, which gain more votes 
from their constituents.46 Therefore, legislators devote to fulfill their constituents’ 
interests. As explained above, constituents are legislators’ principal. Therefore, 
legislators are sensitive with the interests of constituents in their own districts. 
 USAID is a U.S. federal government agency in charge of U.S. foreign 
assistance. It was established in 1961 as a temporary agency and possesses a weak 
constituency base.47 This means that its position is always under risk of reduction 
or removal. Besides its function as a conductor of foreign aid programs, the goal of 
USAID as a governmental agency is to survive, to expand and to obtain more 
budget. 
Aid contractors, or development firms, are defined as for-profit firms and 
NGOs hired by the USAID to implement foreign assistance projects.48 Their 
 
45 This thesis limits definition of legislators as House of Representatives. Senators are not 
included. The reason why only House of Representatives are the focus of this thesis is that 
they are more sensitive to interests of their constituents in their districts. As Senators 
represent broader district, they care more about broader interests of constituents rather than 
local interests. 
46 Fiorina, Morris P. and Roger G. Noll, 1978, “Voters, Bureaucrats and Legislators: A Rational 
Choice Perspective on the Growth of Bureaucracy,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 9, 
Issue 2, pp. 239~254. 
47 Snook, 1997, p. 51; The word, “temporary,” is intentionally mentioned. USAID was under the 
risk of removal when it was perceived as an unnecessary agency after the Cold War. 
48 NGOs may be hired by the USAID or financed by the USAID. In this paper, whether they are 
hired or financed is not distinguished. 
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services or projects cover health issues, education, food, technology, transportation 
and many other areas that are considered as development projects. The contractors 
are not a mere third-party outside of the PA relationship. Hired by the USAID 
through contracts, they are USAID’s agents. Moreover, at the same time, they are a 
principal of legislators as well as important interest groups who transmit 
information to the legislators. 
As development firms are the key group in this circular relationship, it is 
important to know what development firms are in detail. They may be specialized 
in international development projects, but not all aid contractors are specialized in 
development projects. For example, Apple Inc. is a private firm whose main 
services or products are not directly related to development programs. Nonetheless, 
USAID contracts with Apple Inc. in order to use their services/products for 
development projects. Though these kinds of private firms do not devote 
themselves to international development projects, in this paper, it is considered a 
development firm because they are still profiting from contracts with USAID. 
Increase in foreign aid budget may benefit the firms. In this research, therefore, 
development firms are defined as all institutions that had a contract in a fiscal year 
with USAID. Although these non-specialized development firms are aid 
contractors, the top contractors, who receive most of the budget, are specialized in 
international development projects (Table B in Appendix B). For example, 
according to Roberts (2014), Chemonics International, Inc., a top contractor 
appearing on the Table B-1, was founded in 1975 by a former Foreign Service 
officer and USAID official. It is highly involved in USAID work in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, mainly doing projects on agriculture and food security. Another top 
contractor, John Snow, Inc. (JSI) is specialized in health issues, such as AIDS. 
International Relief and Development (IRD) is also a top aid contractor which is in 
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charge of community stabilization work and road building.49 Chemonics and other 
top aid contractors are highly specialized in delivering development projects and 
they closely work with USAID. Therefore, their main source of funding is USAID. 
Geographical positions of these development firms are also an important 
factor that should be considered in this paper. The top contractors continuously 
received significant amount of money from USAID throughout the years (2008 ~ 
2017). They are concentrated in the beltway area, which includes Washington DC 
and its neighboring states (Appendix C. Table C). However, as USAID have 
contracted with more development firms from different regions in more recent 
years. Geographical dispersion of development firms will be discussed in more 
detail in the following section. 
Going beyond the extant PA theory, which is limited to a one-way chain of 
delegation, the circular PA relationship among these the three actors shows how 
this institutional structure of foreign aid facilitates pro-foreign-aid policies in the 
U.S. More specifically, this paper analyzes the role of the interest groups, aid 
contractors, in order to explore why some house representatives in the United 
States support pro-foreign-aid policies. The institutional structure of foreign aid in 
the U.S. encourages the development firms to actively participate in maintaining 
and expanding pro-foreign-aid policies. This circular PA relationship facilitates 
distributional effects and informational dissemination. 
 
4. Theoretical Hypotheses 
Why do legislators support pro-foreign-aid policies? It seems irrational for 
 
49 All detailed information about USAID’s top contractors was collected from Table 2 and 3 of 
Roberts (2014: 1038-1040). 
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legislators to provide wealth to foreigners, when their utmost goal is to gain votes 
from constituents in their own districts. If their foremost goal is to keep their 
offices, they should support policies that benefit their constituencies rather than use 
taxpayers’ wealth for foreigners. 
As foreign aid is funded from taxpayers in congressional districts, there is a 
distributive effect of foreign aid. Recognizing the distributional effects of foreign 
aid, legislators have increased its control over USAID.50 The budget and scope of 
activities of USAID are determined and overseen by legislators. Possessing strong 
appropriation power, legislators hold principal position over USAID. 
In order to understand how foreign aid creates distributional effects in a 
more detailed manner, we must understand how USAID handled a crisis during the 
1990s. After the Cold War, USAID faced an imminent crisis. As briefly mentioned 
in the previous section, USAID was a temporary agency. Thus, its status of being 
was vulnerable. During the period of the Cold War, foreign aid was supported as a 
strategic tool. The United States was competing with the Soviet Union in terms of 
foreign aid. In order to make developing countries, especially strategically 
important ones, to its side, foreign aid was exploited as a diplomatic tool. However, 
after the Cold War, its usefulness has been questioned and between 1990 and 2000, 
USAID was under threat of reduction. Some legislators advocated to reduce the 
amount of foreign aid and even to eliminate the USAID.  
In a way, it was an expected process, because foreign aid does not have 
strong constituency. Legislators do not have strong incentives to uphold foreign aid 
policies after its strategic value has diminished. The congressional record, ‘The 
 
50 Milner, Helen V. and Dustin Tingley, 2015, Sailing the Water’s Edge: The Domestic Politics of 
American Foreign Policy, Princeton University Press, p. 152. 
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House Budget Resolution for Fiscal Year 1996,’ shows how serious the problem 
was. It required a 20 percent cut on foreign aid, because “many foreign aid 
programs are [claimed to be] wasteful and counterproductive.”51  Meanwhile, 
USAID faced severe reduction in force as well: “Between 1993 and 1996, 
USAID’s total workforce was reduced by 30 percent… In 1980, USAID had 4,058 
permanent American employees. By 2001, the number had dropped to 2,200, a 45 
percent cut.”52  
This crisis of USAID triggered the rise of contracts with development firms. 
The severe reduction in force led USAID to inescapably contract with private 
development firms. Hiring private contractors for executing foreign assistance 
programs was inevitable to USAID. USAID had to outsource in order to fill up the 
vacancy. The relationship between USAID and development firms are typical 
principal-agent relation as USAID hires development firms through contracts. 
Interestingly, USAID seems to exploit its action of hiring development firms 
as an appeal to the legislators. Legislators are highly interested in employment and 
delivery of federal funding to their own congressional district. USAID was aware 
of the legislators’ interests and it used this fact strategically in order to fulfill its 
own interests, USAID’s survival and expansion. Contracts with development firms 
provide more finance and possibly increase employment in a congressional district, 
 
51 House of Representatives, 1995, Concurrent Resolution on the Budget - Fiscal Year 1996; 
Schrayer, Liz, 2017, “The Politics of Foreign Aid,” https://www.brookings.edu/ research/the-
politics-of-foreign-aid/, (Last accessed May 19 2019). 
52 Natsios, Andrew, 2011, The Clash of the Counter-Bureaucracy and Development, Center for 
Global Development; Roberts, Susan M., 2014, “Development Capital: USAID and the Rise 
of Development Contractors,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 104, 
Issue 5, pp. 1030~1051; Stanger, Allison, 2009, One Nation under Contract: The Outsourcing 
of American Power and the Future of Foreign Policy, Yale University Press. 
 ３０ 
which is consistent with interests of legislators. It was a part of strategic decision of 
USAID to allocate aid contracts across congressional districts. Fleck and 
Kilby(2001, p.600) states that USAID intentionally uses the database to provide 
evidence of “widespread benefits to American firms and workers” and advertises 
the benefits for each state through its website. 
As Figure III-2 shows, contracts that USAID has made with private 
development firms have increased quite continuously, especially at of domestic 
private contracts. Many branches of responsibilities that USAID held have been 
delegated to private development firms over time. This means that there are 




Figure III-2. Trend of USAID’s Private Contracts: The first graph shows the total 
amount that USAID spent on contracts with private development firms and NGOs in billion 
dollars. The second graph shows the number of contracts that USAID made every year. 
Data Source. Federal Procurement Data System. 
 
In order to understand that legislators consider foreign aid seriously, it is 
important to check whether the amount of money flowed into a congressional 
district was significant enough to catch attention from legislators. Indeed, the sum 
of money flowing into development firms is not insignificant. It has direct 
distribution effects of foreign aid throughout congressional districts. During the 
114th Congress, Washing D.C. received 12.8 billion dollars, Virginia’s 8 th 
congressional district 2.4 billion and Maryland’s 8th 1.8 billion. Significant amount 
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of USAID contracts flowed into domestic firms and promotes positive 
distributional effects in the congressional districts.53 Some large development 
firms are highly dependent on USAID projects that it would be hard to survive if 
funding for foreign aid is significantly reduced. In Foreign Policy, John Norris 
mentions states that: 
 
“The 10 largest USAID contractors received more than $3.19 billion 
in 2011, and more than 27 percent of the agency’s overall funding was 
directed to American for-profit firms last year. To put this in 
perspective, if the for-profit contractor Chemonics were a country, it 
would have been the third-largest recipient of USAID funding in the 
world in 2011, behind only Afghanistan and Haiti.”54 
 
As mentioned in chapter 1, USAID was 22nd highest budget receiver 
among 96 agencies in 2017. 0.3 percent of the total budget is not an 
insignificant portion of the whole government spending. This amount is big 
enough to draw attention from aid-related firms and legislators. 
Moreover, expansion of private development firms definitely grows the 
related employment. Figure III-3 clearly demonstrates that the number of firms 
participating in foreign aid programs and funded by USAID has increased rapidly. 
This means that more people are working in the development field. Though it is 
hard to get data on employment of each development firm, it is important to 
 
53 Berrios, Ruben, 2000, Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in US 
Foreign Development Assistance, Praeger Pub Text, p. 7. 
54 Norris, John, 2012, “Hired Gun Fight,” Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/ 2012/07/18/ 
hired-gun-fight/, (Last accessed November 30 2018).  
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highlight that top development firms hire thousands of employees. According to 
<Table 2> presented in Roberts (2014, p.1040), Chemonics International, Inc. hires 
more than 3,200 in 2012/2013, Development Associates International, Inc. (DAI) 
about 2,000, John Snow, Inc. (JSI) about 2,100, and Abt Associates more than 
2,000. The size of development firms is large that they hire thousands of 
employees.55 Providing jobs for constituents is one of important task that matters a 
lot to a legislator. This truly attracts legislators’ attention and helps gain more 
political support for foreign aid. It is true that there was only weak constituency 
until the early 2000s. However, as illustrated in figure III-2 and III-3, the number 
of contracting firms has increased. This means that foreign aid is gaining stronger 
constituency. 
 
Figure III-3. The Number of USAID Aid Contractors: The graph shows how many 
private development firms and NGOs contracted with USAID in a year. Data Source. 
Federal Procurement Data System. 
 
55 According to U.S. Small Business Administration, small business is defined as a firm having 
fewer than 500 employees. The development firms are not small but are large business. 
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In order to gain support from the legislative, it is important to turn more 
legislators to pro-foreign-aid side. Private firms in a district facilitate congressional 
support for foreign aid, because they are also voters in the congressional districts. 
In other words, development firms are voters, a portion of constituents. Thus, a 
circular principal-agent relationship is formed among the three groups of actors. 
Noting that legislators do care about funds that their constituents receive 
from USAID contracts, USAID appeals to legislators by explaining the 
distributional effects of foreign aid. Recently, at a testimony, the USAID 
Administrator, Mark Green, mentioned the efforts of USAID to engage with 
private sector in order to appeal to legislators: 
 
“Fulfilling our responsibility to taxpayers is about much more than 
asking other donors to increase their contributions… In our case, it 
also means strengthening private-sector engagement through true 
collaborations… to further these efforts with financing tools, and have 
a whole of government approach to private sector engagement.”56 
 
This quote shows that USAID is aware that legislators take heed of how tax 
is spent. In order to gain support from legislators, USAID tries to ensure them that 
it is putting efforts to enhance the private-sector engagement. Though Green does 
not specify whether the private sector indicates those in the U.S. or in foreign 
 
56 Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018, “U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator 




countries, the trend of USAID contracts in Figure III-2 and Figure III-3 exhibits 
that USAID has multiplied contracts with private firms in the U.S rather than 
foreign firms.  
Strategically, it is better for USAID to make contracts disperse across 
congressional districts in order to gain more political support for foreign aid and to 
survive. As illustrated in Figure III-4, initially only a few congressional districts 
have received contracts from USAID.57 However, USAID hire more and more 
private firms, it started to hire more firms from different congressional districts. 
 
57 Most of the contracts were concentrated in the area called ‘beltway’ area, which includes 
Washington D.C. and its nearby areas. 
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Figure III-4. Maps of USAID Contract Allocation (110th, 113th, and 115th Congress): 
from 2007 to 2018, the number of congressional districts where private firms receive 











































USAID contract amount in 115th
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Initially, it was inevitable for USAID to employ private firms during its 
period of crisis. Is it by accident that USAID hired more private firms from 
different congressional districts? In order to discover whether this distribution of 
USAID contracts across congressional districts has some political implication, 
there needs some more evidence. 
Evidence that USAID was aware of distributional effects of these contracts 
can be found in the phone calls received in the liaison office of USAID. Legislators 
are sensitive with distributional effects of foreign aid in reality can be found in the 
liaison office of USAID. Fiorina (1989), while explaining legislative liaison, gives 
an example of the Agency for International Development.58 He cites De Grazia’s 
example:  
 
“A sampling which represented probably 75 percent of the total, was 
made of matters handled in the AID Congressional Liaison Office 
during a single week. The sampling revealed 168 telephone calls from 
members of Congress and their staffs on such matter as: a company in 
Wisconsin wanting to bid on planes; a constituent wanting an 
appointment on a project in Guatemala; a company in North Dakota 
wanting a contract; a firm protesting an AID contract award to an 
Oregon firm; …and employment interest of constituents. During that 
week there were also 84 requests from members of Congress for 
information… Approximately 75 letters were sent during that week to 
members of Congress in response to mail or telephone requests.”59 
 
58 USAID was called Agency for International Development (AID) in the past. 
59 Edward de Grazia, “Congressional Liaison- An Inquiry into Its Meaning for Congress,” in 
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This example clearly exhibits that legislators are aware of the fact that foreign aid 
has distribution effects and it is beneficial for them if they bring foreign aid to their 
congressional district as a pork barrel. USAID is also aware of legislators being 
sensitive to interests of their congressional districts. In this sense, legislators are 
more likely to support pro-foreign-aid bills if they perceive foreign aid as a pork 
barrel to their districts. 
To summarize, I argue that foreign aid creates distributional effects within 
the U.S. and that this leads to congressional support towards foreign aid. Though 
many perceive foreign aid as a task of handing money to developing countries, 
significant part of foreign aid comes back to the donor countries’ pocket. When 
USAID executes foreign aid projects, they do not simply offer funds to the 
developing countries; however, they hire many private for-profit firms in the U.S. 
Thus, congressional districts where development firms are given with considerable 
amount of foreign aid budget benefit from expansion of foreign assistance. 
Legislators, who are sensitive with interests of constituents, are likely to sponsor 
pro-foreign-aid bills if their constituents take advantages from them. Therefore, this 
logic leads to the first hypothesis in this research. 
 
Hypothesis 1: As private contractors or development firms in a congressional 
district receive more fund from USAID, the legislator in the district is more likely to 
support pro-foreign-aid policies. 
 
Hypothesis 1 is established based on the fact that development firms form a 
 
Congress: The First ranch, p. 314; recited from Fiorina, Morris P., 1989, Congress: Keystone 
of the Washington Establishment, Yale University Press, pp. 64~65. 
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portion of constituency in a congressional district, who benefit from foreign aid. 
Another aspect of development firms that should be highlighted is that they form 
an interest group, a group with common interest. As explained above, the aid 
contractors are delegated by USAID to carry out U.S. foreign aid programs. Their 
source of finance is affected by foreign aid budget. Considering that some of top 
contractors are started with the contracts and have grown into larger firms profiting 
from USAID contracts, we can assume that their finance is highly influenced by 
USAID budget.60 In fact, congressional appropriation for foreign aid is closely 
related to their livelihood as well as development firms’ organizational goals. 
Therefore, they have strong incentives to support foreign aid. 
Dependent on contracts of USAID, aid contractors seem to be at the bottom 
of the delegation chain. As an agent, they are simultaneously overseen by their 
principal, USAID. They can be exempted from foreign aid programs by USAID if 
they are not delivering assigned tasks properly. Expulsion of Academy for 
Education Development (AED) from USAID contract outlines that USAID is able 
to rescind contracts with the private contractors when the firms abuse their 
discretion.61 It was criticized by both Congress and USAID. This incident shows 
that development firms are agents, which are under control of their principals, 
USAID and the Congress. 
However, this simple one-way principal-agent chain is not the end of the 
explanation about the relationship among the key actors. The presence of aid 
 
60 It is possible that they have multiple financial sources other than USAID contract. However, as 
it is explained, it is reasonable to assume that their financial status is highly influenced by 
foreign aid budget allocated to USAID; Robert, 2014, pp. 1036~1039. 
61  AED committed “serious corporate misconduct, mismanagement and a lack of internal 
controls” in Pakistan projects. It was expelled from the contract list of USAID. 
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contractors creates more intriguing relationships between the three key groups of 
actors. Aid contractors or development firms hold more than one role in the PA 
relationship. They are not just a beneficiary of foreign aid programs. As a special 
interest group, they are a facilitator of informational dissemination among domestic 
actors. They form a special interest group as they have a common interest to 
actively convince legislators to support foreign aid policy and to expand contracts 
to private firms. 
As many political science literatures emphasize, interest groups play a 
significant role in affecting legislators’ decision-making process (Grossman and 
Helpman, 2001; Anthony, 1957). They actively contact, educate, and provide 
information to the legislators. This activity of disseminating information and 
persuading legislators can be called ‘lobbying activities.’ However, there is an 
obstacle for an interest group called ‘collective action problem.’ Unless the interest 
group overcomes this problem, effective lobbying activities would be very difficult. 
Even though multiple groups or individuals have a common interest, it does 
not mean that it is mandatory for them to act collectively. Collective action is hard 
to be arranged, because there is always a free-rider problem. 62 Thus, there still 
needs some more explanation about collective action problems, when I claim that 
aid contractors or development firms form an interest group and they conduct 
lobbying activities in order to influence legislators’ decision-making process in 
foreign aid field.  
 
62 Mancur Olson claims that though there is a group of people with a common interest, it is not 
necessarily directly connected to formation of a group, who acts collectively. Problem of 
free-riding. In case of development firms, there were k-group that pioneered formation of a 
group for collective action. See Olson, Mancur, 1971, The Logic of Collective Action, 
Harvard University Press, Chapter 1 & 2. 
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In reality, NGOs and for-profit development firms compete over the 
governmental resource. Though it is better for all aid contractors to act collectively 
in order to make an ally of legislators, it is rational for an individual aid contractor 
to do nothing and wait for others to take an action. As the number of aid 
contractors increases, collective action problem becomes more apparent. 
As a solution to this collective action problem, aid contractors have formed 
an alliance in order to overcome this collective action problem. In earl 1990s, aid 
contractors decided to join a lobbyist group called Professional Services Council 
(PSC) out of fear that foreign aid industry would decline if there is no 
congressional support.63 
Enrollment to PSC was an initial gesture of aid contractors. As a more active 
way to overcome this collective action problem, the aid contractors have formed a 
group, called the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC). USGLC is consist of 
more than 500 businesses and non-profits and its leaders are mostly leaders of top 
aid contractors. The top aid contractors have become the k-group that helps 
overcoming collective action problems. As stated in its website, its mission is “to 
strengthen America’s civilian-led tools-development and diplomacy -alongside 
defense. [It advocates] for a strong International Affairs Budget.”64 This group has 
relentlessly contacted with legislators and lobbied for international development 
policies. Through lobbying, they have provided information to legislators, USAID, 
and also to the public. 
In fact, in addition to individual lobbying activities of aid contractors, 
 
63 PSC is a lobbying organization which advocates for the federal contractors; Lundsgaarde, 2012, 
p. 154~155. 
64 USGLC’s official website: https://www.usglc.org (Last accessed May 10 2019) 
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USGLC forms a strong coalition among the development firms, and it has been 
most active in lobbying pro-foreign-aid policies. The following quote from the 
president and chief executive officer of USGLC highlights how lobbying activities 
of aid contractors contributed to political support for foreign aid: 
 
“In the past decade, the most consequential and lasting shifts in 
policymakers’ support for foreign assistance has come as the 
groundwork spread far outside the beltway. In the last election cycle 
alone, nearly 200 candidates met with foreign assistance advocates—
groups of local business, faith, NGO, veteran, and community 
leaders—in their home districts. These meetings, led by highly 
influential supporters of foreign assistance, have been critical in both 
educating skeptics and reinforcing champions, showcasing the 
strength of constituent support for global development.”65 
 
Provision of information to legislators is at the heart of lobbying activities.66 
Some lobbyists even write a bill by themselves in place of a legislator. The aid 
contractors individually and collectively lobby the legislators. Figure III-5 shows 
which issue the top 15 aid contractors lobbied for and Figure III-6 the number of 
legislators who sponsored bills that top 15 aid contractors have lobbied for from 
 
65 Schrayer, 2017. 
66 Austen-Smith, David, 1993, “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes,” 
American Journal of Political Science, pp. 799~833; Austen-Smith, David, 1996, Interest 
Groups: Money, Information and Influence, Cambridge; Lohmann, Susanne, 1995, 
“Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying,” Public Choice, 
Vol. 85, Issue 3-4, pp. 267~284. 
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2008 to 2017.67 For convenience, we call these legislators the “lobbied sponsors.” 
These descriptive figures show that aid contractors have continuously lobbied to 
legislators and they mostly lobbied for bills related to foreign policy and budget. 
Since top 15 contractors receive significant amount of money from USAID for 




Figure III-5. Issues Lobbied by Top 15 USAID Contractors (2008-2017): it shows the 
frequency of lobby contacts of the top 15 USAID contractors for each issue area. Budget 
issue (BUD) is the most frequently-lobbied issue, while foreign affairs (FOR) is the second 
most frequently-lobbied issue. Data Source: LobbyView.org68 
 
67 Among about 4,200 aid contractors, top 15 contractors each year are selected. Top 15 
contractors (2008-2017) and groups they have formed for collective action for lobbying 
include: ACDI/VOCA, Engility Corp., Deloitte Consulting LLP, Deloitte LLP, Population 
Services International, Save the Children Federation Inc., US Fund for UNICEF, L-3 
Communications Holdings Inc., Catholic Relief Services, Tetra Technologies Inc., Gavi 
Alliance, Development Alternatives Inc., Friends of the World Food Program (World Food 
Program USA), Academy for Educational Development, BearingPoint Inc., Berger Group 
Holdings, Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., Research Triangle Institute, AECOM Inc., Computer 
Sciences Corp, US Global Leadership Campaign, Planned Parenthood Federation of America. 
68 Kim, In Song, 2018, “LobbyView: Firm-level Lobbying & Congressional Bills Database,” 
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Figure III-6. The Number of Lobbied Sponsors: the graph indicates the number of bills 
sponsored by the top 15 aid contractors. According to the partisanship of a legislator who 
sponsored the bill, the lobbied sponsors can be divided into republicans and democrats. 
Data Source: LobbyView.org 
 
The following question that should be answered is whether the lobbying 
activities of aid contractors were effective. In a report posted in Brookings.edu, Liz 
Schrayer (2017) provides an example of two congressmen who have changed their 
preferences towards foreign aid. She states that a junior member of Congress from 
the Midwest initially objected foreign aid-claiming that it is better to build a school 
at home than abroad. However, after he visited a USAID agriculture program in 
Africa, “he became a staunch believer and vocal advocate for the foreign assistance 
budget.” Similarly, a newly elected senator, who had said his constituents do not 
like foreign aid, changed his thought after meeting prominent and well-respected 
 
Working paper available from: http://web.mit.edu/insong/www/pdf/lobbyview.pdf. (Last 
accessed May 17 2019). 
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generals and diplomats in a meeting held by the USGLC. It is hard to say that the 
two examples represent the whole Congress; however, these two examples clearly 
reveal that lobbying activities have some degree of influence over legislators. 
In summary, USAID contractors have formed a strong coalition and they 
strategically lobby in order to promote pro-foreign-aid bills. They deliver 
information about the importance of foreign aid as well as its distributional effects. 
Therefore, in this research, I suggest another hypothesis highlighting this role of 
aid contractors. 
 
Hypothesis 2: A legislator is more likely to support pro-foreign-aid policies when 
he/she is contacted by major USAID contractors.  
 
In order to establish theoretical hypotheses, this chapter has reviewed the 
theories in international politics which explore how domestic politics form foreign 
policies and examined how PA models are applied in political science. By 
combining two concepts, this chapter has built two main hypotheses and 
qualitatively explained the mechanisms operating behind the hypotheses. In order 
to test these hypotheses, this paper employs a quantitative analysis.  
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IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
Asking why donor countries continuously provide foreign aid to developing 
countries, this thesis investigates domestic political dynamics within the U.S. and 
the preceding chapter suggests two hypotheses pointing out the roles played by the 
development firms. In order to test the two hypotheses, this paper operates 
statistical analysis. This section describes data used in statistical analysis and 
presents the results of the analysis. 
 This thesis utilizes congressional district level time-series contract data, 
firm-level lobby data and individual-level legislators’ preference data. The three 
data sets are merged according to their geographical locations. This empirical 
analysis deals with recent time period after the global economic crisis, which is 
from the 111th to the 115th U.S. Congress.69 
 
1. Data 
In order to conduct an empirical analysis for the two hypotheses three main data 
sets are required: legislators’ preferences over foreign aid policies as a dependent 
variable, the amount of aid contracts for each congressional district as independent 
variable for the first hypothesis, and development firms’ lobby contacts to 
legislators as another independent variable for the second hypothesis. 
 
69 There exists a widely held view that foreign aid is vulnerable to economic crisis. When 
economic situations in donor countries are in urgent situation, donor countries tend to take 
care of their domestic issues more ardently than issues in developing countries. On the 
contrary, there are some scholars that effects of economic crisis on foreign aid is ambiguous 
(e.g. Heinrich, Kobayashi and Bryant 2016). In the meantime, the period of global economic 
crisis is not included for this analysis. 
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To measure a legislator’s preferences over foreign aid, this thesis uses 
(co)sponsorship data. Measuring a legislator’s preferences requires a delicate 
approach. Many previous literature use legislators’ voting patterns in order to 
measure legislator’s stance towards an issue.70 However, for foreign aid issue, it is 
problematical to use voting results as the measurement for two reasons. First, there 
are only few votes related to foreign aid issues, because foreign aid is not a salient 
issue. Most of the time, issues of foreign aid do not attract much attention from 
legislators; therefore, it is usually not on an agenda list for voting. Aid-related bills, 
which have vote results, are usually intertwined with other issues or they are 
usually embedded in an omnibus bill.71 Second, a vote of an enthusiastic supporter 
is not distinguished from a vote of a legislator who has other purposes.72 Some 
legislators do not have specific preference in this issue so that they just follow the 
partisan ideology. 
 Instead of voting results, this research utilizes the records that list the 
sponsor and cosponsors of pro-foreign-aid bills in the 111th to 115th Congress as to 
operationalize the legislators’ support for pro-foreign-aid bills. This thesis assumes 
that both sponsorship and cosponsorhip are signals that indicate some degree of 
support for pro-foreign-aid bills.73 
 
70 Milner and Tingley, 2010; Powers, Leblang, and Tierney, 2010, Fleck and Kilby, 2001; 
Peltzman, 1984. 
71 In fact, there are some votes that solely target foreign aid issues. However, the number is so 
small that it is hard to perceive legislators’ preference across the time period. 
72 Baldwin, David A., 1966, “Analytical Notes on Foreign Aid and Politics,” Background, Vol. 10, 
Issue 1, pp.86~87. 
73 Kessler, Daniel and Keith Krehbiel, 1996, “Dynamics of Cosponsorship,” The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 90, Issue 3, pp.555~566; Wilson, Rick K. and Cheryl D. Young, 
1997, “Cosponsorship in the US Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, pp. 25~43. 
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To depict the frequency of a legislator’s sponsorship or cosponsorship, I 
created a ‘sponsorship score’ variable. This variable counts how many times a 
legislator has sponsored or cosponsored a pro-foreign-aid bill for each Congress. A 
higher sponsorship score indicates that the legislator has a stronger preference for 
pro-foreign-aid policies. 
For this research, among the many bills related to foreign assistance, I chose 
economic development aid bills. Thus, in this research, pro-foreign-aid bills are 
defined as bills that are related to economic development aid. Bills that target 
specific countries, and partisan issues, such as immigration and abolition, are not 
included. In order to obtain the list of pro-foreign-aid bills, I used the website, 
http://Congress.gov. Through this website, I could access bills in international 
affairs policy area with subject terms, ‘foreign aid and international relief.’ Then, 
bills that target specific countries, contain specific partisan issues, or limit foreign 
aid programs by attaching harsh conditions were eliminated. The list of the bills is 
attached as Appendix D. With these pro-foreign-aid bills, dependent variable is 
made. This variable indicates how many pro-foreign-aid bills each legislator has 
sponsored or cosponsored. This dependent variable is called ‘pro-FA(Foreign Aid) 
sponsorship score.’  
Figure IV-1 shows a histogram of the data in each congress. As expected, 0 
pro-FA score shows the highest frequency. This means that a large portion of 
legislators do not actively support pro-foreign-aid bills. This implies that they are 
either indifferent to the foreign aid bills or they are on the side of anti-foreign aid. 
It is difficult to differentiate between indifference towards foreign aid and anti-
foreign-aid position. However, it is reasonable to say that a legislator has a 
supportive stance towards foreign aid if he/she sponsors or cosponsors pro-foreign-
aid bills. Sponsorship or cosponsorship of pro-foreign-aid bills is considered as an 
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active political gesture representing pro-foreign-aid stance. 
 
 
Figure IV-1. Histogram of Pro-foreign-aid (pro-FA) Score: the histogram shows the 
number of legislators arranged according to their frequency of (co)sponsoring a pro-
foreign-aid policy. According to this histogram, most legislators do not co(sponsor) a pro-
foreign-aid bill; therefore, the highest bar is on 0. There are few legislators who 
co(sponsored) pro-FA bills more than 15 times. Data Source: Congress.gov. 
 
In order to test the first hypothesis, “As private contractors or development 
firms in a congressional district receive more fund from USAID, the legislator in 
the district is more likely to support pro-foreign-aid policies,” the amount of funds 
that development firms receive from USAID should be calculated. As development 
firms take a portion of constituents in a congressional district, foreign aid becomes 





Figure IV-2. Aid Contract Data Screenshot: it is a screen-captured image of the data 
downloaded from USAspending.gov. In the data set, the ID for each award given to 
development firms, the amount of the award, award given date, purpose of the award, name 
of the development firms, their congressional districts, type of the development firms, and 
some characteristics of the firms. Data Source: USAspending.gov. 
 
The data of the amount of aid contracts allocated across the congressional 
districts is available to the public. The Federal Funding Accountability and 
Transparency Act of 2006 (FFATA) “requires federal contract, grant, loan, and 
other financial assistance awards of more than $25,000 be displayed on a publicly 
accessible and searchable website to give the American public access to 
information on how their tax dollars are being spent.” 74  The website, 
USAspending.gov, offers information about each contract that USAID made with 
private firms from 2008. Figure IV-2 shows a portion of the whole data set. The 
data contains 251 columns of variables. Among these, names of the development 
firms, the amount of federal action, the year, and the congressional district that the 
development firm is located in are extracted for the analysis. With this data, I 
aggregated the amount of money that each development firm received from 
 
74 Quoted from https://www.usaspending.gov/#/about (Last accessed November 2 2018). 
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USAID by congressional districts. With this new variable, I could identify how 
much money was delivered to domestic development firms in each congressional 
district through aid contracts with the USAID. 
In order to test the second hypothesis, “A legislator is more likely to support 
pro-foreign-aid policies when he/she is contacted by major USAID contractors,” it 
is necessary to measure whether a legislator had a contact with a development firm. 
In order to operationalize this action, this thesis sets a lobby variable. In this paper, 
it is assumed that transmission of information about the importance of foreign 
assistance as well as the distributive effects toward a legislator’s district is 
conveyed through the lobbying activities of development firms. Therefore, data 
that identifies which firms contacted whom are two necessary information required 
for creating this variable. However, there is no data that provides this lobbying 
connection between a firm and a legislator. A lobby variable presented in this thesis 
is established with an intention to indicate whether a legislator has been in contact 
with a development firm but unfortunately it has some critical limitations. 
Among many development firms, this paper considers only top 15 aid 
contractors who received the largest sum of funds for aid contracts from USAID 
between 2008 and 2015.75 In addition, USGLC, which is an organization formed 
by aid contractors and other development firms, is included in the list. Founded on 
the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, lobby reports are available to the public. 
Lobbyview.org provides a comprehensive digitalized lobby data. On the 
LobbyView website, I manually checked whether the top contractors have ever 
 
75 Among these top 15 contractors, only a portion of them made a lobby report. Not all top 15 
contractors have lobbied. The names of the top 15 contractors are written in the footnote 
no.64. 
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lobbied since 2008. When it is confirmed that a firm has lobbied, all the lobby 
reports submitted by the firm are extracted.  
It should be accounted that there is a critical limitation using this lobby data. 
The data lists the name of the sponsor of a bill that the firm has lobbied for. It never 
states whether the lobbyist directly contacted a legislator. Therefore, this paper 
assumes that when a lobbyist lobby for a bill, it had a direct contact with the 
sponsor of the bill. Lobbyists are known as transferrer of information. Some are 
known to even write a bill by themselves. Following extant literature, I assume that 
lobbyists are closely related to the sponsor of the bill mentioned in the lobby 
report.76 The variable is dichotomous. It is recorded as 1 if the legislator has 
contacted with any top aid contractor. 
Another factor that must be taken into account is the issue area that the 
lobby pursues. It is possible that the top aid contractors contact a legislator for 
reasons other than aid-related purposes, because the development firm may have 
multiple interests. It may lobby for bills related to transportation, energy, budget 
and others. Among other issues, foreign affairs issue is where foreign aid bills 
belong. In order to extract more exact proxy for aid-lobby contacts, a model 
(Model 4) in the results uses the lobby data which only belongs to foreign affairs 
issues. 
Besides the two main hypotheses, other factors that might affect legislators’ 
 
76 Kim, In Song, 2017, “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm-Level Lobbying for Trade 
Liberalization,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 111, Issue 1, pp. 1~20; Kim, In Song 
and Dmitriy Kunisky, 2018, “Mapping Political Communities: A Statistical Analysis of 
Lobbying Networks in Legislative Politics”; Kim, In Song, 2018, “LobbyView: Firm-level 
Lobbying & Congressional Bills Database,” Working paper available from: 
http://web.mit.edu/ insong/www/pdf/ lobbyview.pdf. (Last accessed May 17 2019). 
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preference over foreign aid should be taken into account. In order to control these 
factors, control variables are added. The first factor that should be explained is a 
legislator’s ideology. In extant literatures, it has been discussed that a government 
whose dominant party is the left or supports domestic redistribution tends to 
strengthen foreign aid.77 Therefore, legislators with more left-leaning ideology are 
more likely to actively support foreign aid rather than those with more right-
leaning ideology. In order to put this factor as a control variable in this analysis, 
this paper measures a legislator’s ideology using DW-NOMINATE score, which 
measures the ideology of each legislator through voting records. 
Second, a membership in the Foreign Affairs Committee or the 
Appropriations Committee is another factor that should be accounted. A committee 
is a sub-organization in the Congress, which fosters floor debate about bills related 
to the committee issue and handle the issues. Therefore, if a legislator belongs to 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, he/she has more opportunities and duties to handle 
foreign aid issues. This does not guarantee that they are on the pro-foreign-aid side, 
but it is likely that the committee members actively debate about foreign-aid bills; 
therefore, have more chances for the more active support. Moreover, the 
Appropriations Committee member is also likely to deal with issues related to 
foreign aid budget. In the same logic, they have more chances of actively dealing 
with foreign aid issues. In order to account this factor, this paper uses Stewart and 
Woon(2017)’s committee data. The Foreign Affairs/Appropriations Committee 
variable is checked as 1 if the legislator is in the committee and 0 otherwise. 
 
77 Lumsdaine, David H., 1993, “Do Morals Matter in International Politics?” Moral Vision in 
International Politics: The Foreign Aid Regime, 1949-1989, pp.3~29; Thérien, Jean-Philippe 
and Alain Noel, 2000. 
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Economic factors are added as control variables as well. Though it is 
controversial, foreign aid is usually known to be vulnerable to economic crisis. 
Bring this logic to the congressional district level, bad economic situation in a 
congressional district leads to less supportive attitude towards foreign aid. In order 
to measure economic status of a congressional district, this paper employs median 
household income and unemployment rate of each congressional district. Milner 
and Tingley(2010) has also used these two indicators as control variables. 
Merging all data sets, this thesis operates a regression analysis. Table IV-1 
shows the list of dependent, independent and control variables used in the 
















Variables Description Data Source 
FA score 
The frequency of 
sponsorship/cosponsorship towards  
pro-foreign aid bills 
Congress.gov 
ln(aid contract) Logged amount of aid contracts in a congressional district. USAspending.gov 
lobby 
Lobby contact variable that indicates 
whether an aid contractor has lobbied 





First NOMINATE dimension that 
measures left-to-right ideological 
scale. (Liberal: negative value,  
Conservative: positive value) 
Voteview.com 
FA comm. Coded 1, if the legislator is in the foreign affairs committee 




Coded 1, if the legislator is in the 
appropriation committee 
Stewart III &Woon 
(2017) 
ln(income) Logged household income in each congressional district. 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
unemployment Unemployment rate in each congressional district. 
U.S. Census 
Bureau 
Table IV-1. List of Dependent/Independent/Control Variables: the table shows the name 
of the variables appearing on the result table, their descriptions and data source.  
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2. Results 
Table IV-2. Results: 5 models are employed for the analysis. Model 1 is a pooled OLS 
analysis, Model 2 a fixed-effect analysis, Model 3 a random-effect analysis, Model 4 
another fixed-effect analysis (with ‘lobby’ variable subjected to foreign affairs issue only), 
and Model 5 fixed-effect negative binomial analysis. 
 
This paper analyzes the legislators’ sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills 
between the 111th and 115th Congress by employing fixed-effect negative binomial 
model (Model 5). The unit of analysis in this research is a legislator in a Congress. 
Though it is appropriate to use fixed-effect negative binomial model, this paper 
also provides results derived from other models. The following table IV-2 shows 
results obtained from 5 models: Model 1 is a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
model, Model 2 a fixed-effect model, Model 3 a random-effect model, Model4 
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another fixed-effect model with modified ‘lobby’ variable and additional economic 
variables, and finally Model 5 a fixed-effect negative binomial model. 
Model 1 is the result of OLS analysis. The results exhibit that both aid 
contract amount and lobby variables have significant effects on pro-foreign-aid 
score. Among the five models, this first model shows the strongest impact of the 
explanatory variables. However, this model may be the one with the most biases. It 
assumes that observations are independent from one another. Legislators’ 
preference for pro-foreign-aid bills are likely to be influenced by geographical as 
well as time variables. Consequently, this model is not an appropriate model for 
this empirical analysis.  
In order to minimize this group-level variation, both fixed-effect model and 
random-effect model are implemented in Model2 and 3. For Model2, I added states 
and congress dummy variables, which indicate geographical and time groups 
respectively. These nuisance dummy variables are not reported in the table IV-2. 
By containing the states’ natural characteristics and time-specific characteristics, it 
is possible to find more valid results. Both fixed and random-effect models show 
that contract amounts in a congressional district and lobby contacts increase the 
likelihood of a legislator’s decision to sponsor pro-foreign-aid bills. 
Model 4 is also a fixed-effect model like Model2 but with a different set of 
lobby variable and with new economic control variables. For Model 4, new lobby 
variable, which considers only lobby activities under foreign issue. Lobby reports 
under budget, tax and the other issues are not taken into account. In addition, 
because economic data in the 115th Congress data is incomplete, the data of this 
time period is removed and two economic control variables are added. Many trials 
and combinations of these changes show the robust relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables. 
 ５８ 
However, these four models are not the best models for estimation, because 
of the distribution of the dependent variable. As figure IV-1 shows, the dependent 
variable in this research is a count data with many zeros. Therefore, it is necessary 
to adjust this distortion.78 For a dependent variable with inflated-zero distribution, 
negative binomial model is appropriate. Therefore, for Model 5, the fixed-effect 
negative binomial model is used in order to reduce this bias. 
Table IV-2 show that regardless of the models, both the amount of aid 
contracts in a congressional district and lobby contact with a legislator in a district 
have positive relationship with aid bill sponsorship. Though not reported, results 
derived from the poisson, the zero-inflated poisson, and the zero-inflated binomial 
models display consistent and robust relationships among the variables. Controlling 
other variables, as more amount of contract money goes to a congressional district, 
a legislator in the district is more likely to support for pro-foreign-aid bills. 
Moreover, development firms’ lobbying activities are highly associated with 
legislators’ sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills. These results confirm both 
hypotheses suggested in the previous section.   
 
78 Long, J. Scott, 1997, “Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables,” 
Advanced Quantitative Techniques in the Social Sciences; Cameron, A Colin and Pravin K 




By questioning why developed countries continue to provide foreign aid to 
developing countries, this paper examines the role of development firms in the 
continuing domestic support of foreign aid in the U.S. Development firms are not 
only agents who work on behalf of USAID, but they are also the principals of 
legislators. This unique position of development firms creates a circular principal-
agent relationship among the three key actors in the foreign aid arena: U.S. 
Congress, USAID, and development firms. Moreover, as an interest group with a 
strong preference towards pro-foreign-aid policies, development firms disseminate 
information and persuade legislators to support foreign aid through lobbying 
activities. 
Based on the circular principal-agent theory of domestic support for foreign 
aid, this paper proposes and tests two hypotheses. Through analyzing individual-
level legislator data, congressional district-level contract data, and firm-level lobby 
data from the 111th to 115th Congress, I found that (1) the allocation of aid contracts 
across congressional districts is positively correlated to the frequency of 
(co)sponsorship for pro-foreign-aid bills and (2) lobby contacts of top development 
firms are positively associated with the frequency of pro-foreign-aid 
(co)sponsorship.  
This paper complements extant researches in four aspects. In addition to the 
preceding efforts of analyzing international politics through the prism of domestic 
politics, this thesis investigates how foreign aid is maintained and expanded by 
examining the political dynamics of domestic actors. Moreover, by modifying the 
extant one-way principal-agent model, this paper introduces a circular principal-
 ６０ 
agent model. Development firms play multidimensional roles in domestic politics 
that induce a circular structure of principal-agent model. Together with this unique 
form of the principal-agent model, this thesis also stresses the importance of the 
interest groups. Development firms are not mere third party advocating their 
interests. They are implementers of foreign aid projects, legislators’ indispensable 
constituents, as well as information disseminators. Lastly, this paper also 
contributes to the recent academic trend of approaching the research question at a 
micro-level by utilizing congressional district-level and firm-level data for analysis. 
This thesis is not without a limitation. First, it should be remarked that 
political dynamics surrounding a foreign policy cannot be fully explained without 
an international-level analysis. This paper focuses on domestic-political factors to 
explain the continuous support for foreign aid. There requires an international-level 
analysis in order to fully analyze the interaction between international and 
domestic politics. Additionally, the president is another important political actor 
when discussing foreign policy at domestic level. The discussion should be added 
in order to see more precise explanations for the political dynamics within the U.S. 
Moreover, critical assumptions were made when dealing with lobby data. More 
delicate statistical methodology and accurate data are required in order to improve 
this quantitative analysis. Last but not least, there is a lack of external validity. This 
paper focuses on the case of the U.S. There is no evidence that the same statements 
are applicable to other developed countries. As each country has a different state-
market relationship, the theory presented in this paper is not applicable to all 
countries. It may be applicable to those countries with a high level of privatization 
and lobbying system; and less appropriate to more state-centric countries. 
Despite these limitations, this paper still propounds some policy 
implications. There is a tendency that people perceive interest groups negatively, 
 ６１ 
because they lobby in favor of their own interests. This paper shows that their 
interest-seeking behavior generates positive impacts on international cooperation. 
Private for-profit development firms provide critical links in domestic and 
international politics. The empowerment of development firms through a series of 
policies and transparent connection with political actors would help secure 
domestic support for foreign aid. Nevertheless, we should be cautious about the 
downsides of this dynamics as well. Although these development firms help 
promote domestic support for foreign aid, it is not desirable to propel foreign aid 
policies solely from an interest-seeking perspective. It is always necessary to 
recognize the fundamental goal of foreign aid. Executive agencies, such as USAID, 
should overwatch development firms’ activities in delivering international 
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Appendix A. The Trend of ODA Flow 
 
Figure A-1. Trend of ODA Flow (total amount of ODA from OECD countries): the 
overall ODA flow shows an increasing trend. The total amount of ODA from OECD 




Appendix B. Top 10 Aid Contractors 
year state company amount 
rank 
2008 DC GLOBAL HEALTH FUND 640784629 
1 
2008 VA 
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INC. 512475414 
2 
2008 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 500653661 
3 
2008 DC ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 325704954 
4 
2008 DC 
GAVI ALLIANCE (FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE 
GAVI FUND) 287652000 
5 
2008 DC WORLD FOOD FOR PROGRAM 278894000 
6 
2008 NJ BERGER LOUIS GROUP INC 254627581 
7 
2008 NC RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE 238152114 
8 
2008 GA 
COOPERATIVE FOR ASSISTANCE AND RELIEF 
EVERYWHERE INC (AN ASS 233672459 
9 
2008 DC 
AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH IN THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 211917198 
10 
2009 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 1025880438 
1 
2009 VA BEARINGPOINT INCORPORATED 549302225 
2 
2009 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 541578702 
3 
2009 DC ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 441443392 
4 
2009 NJ BERGER LOUIS GROUP INC 437096444 
5 
2009 DC MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS INTERNATIONAL, INC 363496276 
6 
2009 CA ASIA FOUNDATION (TAF) 317496874 
7 
2009 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 301091966 
8 
2009 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 289422872 
9 
2009 VA 
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INC. (I 246733253 
10 
2010 DC 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION & DEVEL 1157921378 
1 
2010 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 944992742 
2 
2010 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 527114916 
3 
2010 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 514298692 
4 
2010 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 431875000 
5 
 ７３ 
2010 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 334952037 
6 
2010 VA 
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT  
INC. (I 281443613 
7 
2010 DC ACADEMY FOR EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 264971704 
8 
2010 NJ BERGER LOUIS GROUP INC 255244506 
9 
2010 MD CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 234114706 
10 
2011 DC 




INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION & DEVEL 865765666 
2 
2011 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 782119766 
3 
2011 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 736830966 
4 
2011 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 417726429 
5 
2011 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 205614976 
6 
2011 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 203087304 
7 
2011 MD CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 180238917 
8 
2011 VA 
INTERNATIONAL RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INC. 173603550 
9 
2011 NC FAMILY HEALTH INTERNATIONAL 164763728 
10 
2012 DC WORLD BANK OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER 1764828723 
1 
2012 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 824441395 
2 
2012 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 662977571 
3 
2012 DC 
INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR 
RECONSTRUCTION & DEVEL 5.10E+08 
4 
2012 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 442689987 
5 
2012 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 431746164 
6 
2012 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 194829777 
7 
2012 MA MANAGEMENT SCIENCES FOR HEALTH, INC. 189806764 
8 
2012 KS BLACK & VEATCH CORP 185699121 
9 
2012 MD CRS.ORG 164354485 
10 
2013 DC WORLD BANK OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER 2179025233 
1 




PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 592552653 
3 
2013 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 414887238 
4 
2013 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 335764793 
5 
2013 NC FHI 360 286230717 
6 
2013 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 269539328 
7 
2013 MA MANAGEMENT SCIENCES FOR HEALTH, INC. 174785694 
8 
2013 MD JHPIEGO CORPORATION 166762696 
9 
2013 VA AECOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, INC. 161220144 
10 
2014 DC WORLD BANK OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER 1406688988 
1 
2014 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 1053900265 
2 
2014 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 487860912 
3 
2014 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 389233980 
4 
2014 NC FHI 360 311296825 
5 
2014 NY UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND 303841873 
6 
2014 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 271333632 
7 
2014 MD JHPIEGO CORPORATION 217018781 
8 
2014 MA MANAGEMENT SCIENCES FOR HEALTH, INC. 199600228 
9 
2014 MD CRS.ORG 174012754 
10 
2015 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 1245129453 
1 
2015 DC WORLD BANK OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER 1233868943 
2 
2015 VA 
PARTNERSHIP FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
MANAGEMENT, INC 727160280 
3 
2015 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 521144519 
4 
2015 NY UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND 410364801 
5 
2015 MA JOHN SNOW INCORPORATED 408808522 
6 
2015 MD JHPIEGO CORPORATION 305771288 
7 
2015 NC FHI 360 284431330 
8 
2015 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 269721834 
9 
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2015 NC RESEARCH TRIANGLE INSTITUTE 223714626 
10 
2016 DC WORLD BANK OFFICE OF THE PUBLISHER 1691088245 
1 
2016 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 1170594911 
2 
2016 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 1008898124 
3 
2016 DC WORLD BANK 720534846 
4 
2016 NY UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND 363005078 
5 
2016 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 302173755 
6 
2016 MD JHPIEGO CORPORATION 296104458 
7 
2016 NC FHI 360 280787549 
8 
2016 DC 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
MIGRATION 209641457 
9 
2016 MD CRS.ORG 206610214 
10 
2017 DC CHEMONICS INTERNATIONAL INC 1640593138 
1 
2017 DC UNITED NATIONS 1437576030 
2 
2017 DC WORLD BANK 826820993 
3 
2017 DC WORLD FOOD PROGRAM 479212145 
4 
2017 MD CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 345242979 
5 
2017 MD DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES INC 245448190 
6 
2017 DC 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR 
MIGRATION 238537743 
7 
2017 MD JHPIEGO CORPORATION 225050290 
8 
2017 NY US FUND FOR UNICEF 216223162 
9 
2017 NC FHI 360 215643344 
10 
Table B. Top 10 Aid Contractors (by development firm) from 2008 to 2017. 
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Appendix C. Top 10 Aid Contract Receiving States 
year state amount rank 
2008 DC 5479455179 1 
2008 VA 1858448573 2 
2008 MD 1141116729 3 
2008 NY 747075070 4 
2008 MA 735794508 5 
2008 NC 492366196 6 
2008 CA 312615348 7 
2008 NJ 295603891 8 
2008 WA 294558277 9 
2008 GA 247967894 10 
2009 DC 5254604808 1 
2009 VA 2067849421 2 
2009 MD 1223965129 3 
2009 MA 1057439301 4 
2009 NY 651308507 5 
2009 CA 458908870 6 
2009 NJ 439868842 7 
2009 NC 426045368 8 
2009 GA 249960887 9 
2009 WA 204252893 10 
2010 DC 5344094484 1 
2010 VA 1908107524 2 
2010 MD 1763555920 3 
2010 MA 1182873263 4 
2010 NC 659368505 5 
2010 NY 612864608 6 
2010 CA 321200516 7 
2010 VT 269094664 8 
2010 NJ 261987672 9 
2010 WA 253869956 10 
2011 DC 6369421298 1 
2011 MD 1454759481 2 
2011 VA 1358665119 3 
2011 MA 1105383234 4 
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2011 NC 605346577 5 
2011 NY 404176494 6 
2011 CA 262415587 7 
2011 VT 235223861 8 
2011 NJ 158680223 9 
2011 CT 156073599 10 
2012 DC 5520974329 1 
2012 MD 1420878981 2 
2012 MA 1282304790 3 
2012 VA 1277344061 4 
2012 NC 779161761 5 
2012 NY 384506509 6 
2012 CA 297132003 7 
2012 VT 203010363 8 
2012 KS 187736984 9 
2012 CT 140344441 10 
2013 DC 4992221318 1 
2013 VA 1508862563 2 
2013 MD 1269609382 3 
2013 MA 1048541599 4 
2013 NC 637971008 5 
2013 NY 547270534 6 
2013 CA 246499993 7 
2013 VT 192540532 8 
2013 WA 142604008 9 
2013 MI 123506294 10 
2014 DC 4508122076 1 
2014 MD 1359606480 2 
2014 VA 1214049516 3 
2014 MA 956228036 4 
2014 NY 751672695 5 
2014 NC 724511748 6 
2014 CA 240379641 7 
2014 VT 219279655 8 
2014 OR 142898159 9 
2014 CT 124226958 10 
2015 DC 4696314469 1 
 ７８ 
2015 VA 1708668787 2 
2015 MD 1565332935 3 
2015 MA 1239355666 4 
2015 NY 967941086 5 
2015 NC 877473103 6 
2015 CA 375225374 7 
2015 CT 214968474 8 
2015 VT 157351542 9 
2015 WA 136842819 10 
2016 DC 6263455257 1 
2016 MD 1703822603 2 
2016 VA 1044219402 3 
2016 NY 845725751 4 
2016 MA 774132590 5 
2016 NC 745964310 6 
2016 CA 363247244 7 
2016 WA 231957015 8 
2016 VT 193984817 9 
2016 CT 143960893 10 
2017 DC 6137108163 1 
2017 MD 1716956388 2 
2017 NY 904719314 3 
2017 VA 865685923 4 
2017 NC 808152517 5 
2017 MA 806113250 6 
2017 CA 322408519 7 
2017 WA 258021873 8 
2017 CT 189998950 9 
2017 VT 178188451 10 




Appendix D. List of Pro-foreign-aid Bills 
Congress Bill Summary 
111 H.R. 1066 Peace Corps Expansion Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 1410 Newborn, Child, and Mother Survival Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 1511 Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 1702 Shelter, Land, and Urban Management (SLUM) Assistance Act of 
2009 
111 H.R. 1790 Forest Carbon Emission Reduction Act 
111 H.R. 1861 Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 1878 Global Autism Assistance Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 1987 Microfinance Capacity-Building Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2030 Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2103 International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 
2009 
111 H.R. 2139 Initiating Foreign Assistance Reform Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2271 Global Online Freedom Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2387 Strategy and Effectiveness of Foreign Policy and Assistance Act of 
2009 
111 H.R. 2639 Global Poverty Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2737 Child Protection Compact Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2795 Roadmap Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 2817 Roadmap to End Global Hunger and Promote Food Security Act of 
2009 
111 H.R. 2878 Solar Villages Initiative Act 
111 H.R. 3031 Families for Orphans Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3070 Families for Orphans Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3077 Global Food Security Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3240 International Child Abduction Prevention Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3560 21st Century Global Health Technology Act 
111 H.R. 3701 More Books for Africa Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3714 Daniel Pearl Freedom of the Press Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 3774 Energy Development Program Implementation Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 416 Shirley A. Chisholm United States-Caribbean Educational Exchange 
Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 4368 Social Investment and Economic Development for the Americas Act 
of 2010 
 ８０ 
111 H.R. 4392 African Higher Education Expansion and Improvement Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 4594 International Violence Against Women Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 4801 Global Science Program for Security, Competitiveness, and 
Diplomacy Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 4879 Global Democracy Promotion Act 
111 H.R. 4933 Global Health Expansion, Access to Labor, Transparency, and 
Harmonization Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 4959 Global Conservation Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 4962 International Cybercrime Reporting and Cooperation Act 
111 H.R. 5117 Education for All Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 5191 Global Resources and Opportunities for Women to Thrive Act of 
2010 
111 H.R. 5268 Improvements in Global MOMS Act 
111 H.R. 606 International Women’s Freedom Act of 2009 
111 H.R. 6148 Trafficking in Organs Victims Protection Act 
111 H.R. 6153 Foreign Prison Conditions Improvement Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 6521 International Prevention of Child Marriage Act of 2010 
111 H.R. 6535 United States-Africa Trade, Development, and Diaspora Relations 
Promotion Act 
111 H.R. 6565 Global Water Access and Equity Act 
112 H.R. 1389 Global Online Freedom Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 1625 To prohibit funding for the Development Innovation Ventures (DIV) 
program. 
112 H.R. 1856 International Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 2011 
112 H.R. 1940 International Child Abduction Prevention and Return Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2144 21st Century Global Health Technology Act 
112 H.R. 2180 Shelter, Land, and Urban Management (SLUM) Assistance Act of 
2011 
112 H.R. 2404 Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2524 Microenterprise Empowerment and Job Creation Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2639 Global Democracy Promotion Act 
112 H.R. 2643 Medical Neutrality Protection Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2700 Global Autism Assistance Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2705 Education for All Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 2792 African Higher Education Advancement and Development Act of 
2011 
112 H.R. 2880 Contingency Operation and Emergency Oversight Act of 2011 
 ８１ 
112 H.R. 3159 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 3357 Child Marriage Violates the Human Rights of Girls Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 3589 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 3658 Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 3660 Contingency Operations Oversight and Interagency Enhancement Act 
of 2011 
112 H.R. 3888 Solar Villages Initiative Act 
112 H.R. 4141 International Food Assistance Improvement Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 418 International Women’s Freedom Act of 2011 
112 H.R. 5748 United States Leadership to Eradicate Obstetric Fistula Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 5905 International Violence Against Women Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 6087 International Protecting Girls by Preventing Child Marriage Act of 
2012 
112 H.R. 6178 Economic Growth and Development Act 
112 H.R. 6255 Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 6303 Global Science Program for Security, Competitiveness, and 
Diplomacy Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 6422 International Conservation Corps Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 656 African Investment and Diaspora Act 
112 H.R. 6573 Trafficking in Organs Victims Protection Act 
112 H.R. 6644 Global Partnerships Act of 2012 
112 H.R. 80 Global Water Access and Equity Act 
113 H.R. 1195 International Conservation Corps Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 1515 21st Century Global Health Technology Act 
113 H.R. 1793 Global Partnerships Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 1951 Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention 
and Return Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2033 Medical Neutrality Protection Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2548 Electrify Africa Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 2638 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2738 Global Democracy Promotion Act 
113 H.R. 2780 Education for All Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2822 Global Food Security Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2874 Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 2901 Senator Paul Simon Water for the World Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 2935 Conservation Reform Act of 2013 
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113 H.R. 2947 International Women’s Freedom Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 3054 Global Autism Assistance Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 3117 Ending the HIV/AIDS Epidemic Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 3155 United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 
2013 
113 H.R. 3212 Sean and David Goldman International Child Abduction Prevention 
and Return Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 3307 Solar Villages Initiative Act 
113 H.R. 3323 Children in Families First Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 3398 Girls Count Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 3525 International Hydrocephalus Treatment and Training Act 
113 H.R. 3526 Humanitarian Assistance Facilitation Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 3571 International Violence Against Women Act of 2013 
113 H.R. 4143 Children in Families First Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 4640 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 4877 M-CORE Act 
113 H.R. 4905 Global Development Lab Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 4987 Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 4997 United States Leadership to Eradicate Obstetric Fistula Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 5043 PACT Act 
113 H.R. 5656 Global Food Security Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 5703 Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act 
113 H.R. 5710 Ebola Emergency Response Act 
113 H.R. 5837 African Descent Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 5846 Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act of 2014 
113 H.R. 5862 Improvements in Global MOMS Act 
113 H.R. 898 Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2013 
114 H.R. 1039 African Descent Affairs Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 1340 International Violence Against Women Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 1567 Global Food Security Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 1812 Western Hemisphere Drug Policy Commission Act 
114 H.R. 2100 Girls Count Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 2241 Global Health Innovation Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 2494 Eliminate, Neutralize, and Disrupt Wildlife Trafficking Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 2571 M-CORE Act 
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114 H.R. 2740 Global Democracy Promotion Act 
114 H.R. 2845 AGOA Enhancement Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 2870 Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 3706 Reach Every Mother and Child Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 3750 First Responders Passport Act of 2015 
114 H.R. 3766 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 3924 Global Development Lab Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 4481 Education for All Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 4939 United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 5285 To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to require the annual 
human rights reports to include information on the institutionalization 
of children and the subjection of children to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment, unnecessary detention, and denial of the right to 
life, liberty, and the security of persons, and for other purposes. 
114 H.R. 5332 Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2016 
114 H.R. 5537 Digital GAP Act 
114 H.R. 5597 Solar Villages Initiative Act 
114 H.R. 5735 Protecting Girls’ Access to Education in Vulnerable Settings Act  
114 H.R. 5850 Secure the Northern Triangle Act 
114 H.R. 611 Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act 
115 H.R. 1095 Torture Victims Relief Reauthorization Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 1191 Child Soldier Prevention Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 1570 African Descent Affairs Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 1660 Global Health Innovation Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 2168 First Responders Passport Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 2200 Frederick Douglass Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection 
Reauthorization Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 2408 Protecting Girls' Access to Education Act 
115 H.R. 2484 Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 2532 Vulnerable Children and Families Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 2747 Economic Growth and Development Act 
115 H.R. 3030 Elie Wiesel Genocide and Atrocities Prevention Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 3445 AGOA and MCA Modernization Act 
115 H.R. 3612 Prioritizing Education in Conflict Zones Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 4022 Reach Every Mother and Child Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 4121 Global Development Lab Act of 2017 
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115 H.R. 4621 Global Brain Health Act of 2017 
115 H.R. 466 Sex Trafficking Demand Reduction Act 
115 H.R. 4819 DELTA Act 
115 H.R. 4950 D'ARC Act 
115 H.R. 5034 International Violence Against Women Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 5105 BUILD Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 5273 Global Fragility and Violence Reduction Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 5480 Women's Entrepreneurship and Economic Empowerment Act of 
2018 
115 H.R. 5501 End Corruption in the Northern Triangle Act 
115 H.R. 570 Solar Villages Initiative Act 
115 H.R. 600 Digital Global Access Policy Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 6018 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership Act of 2018 
115 H.R. 671 HER Act 
115 H.R. 7055 Keeping Girls in School Act 
Table D. List of Pro-foreign-aid Bills.  
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Appendix E. Statistical Summary 
Variables  Number of Missing values 
FA score 
Min : 0 
Median: 1  
Mean : 2.47 
Max : 21 
0 







no contract record or missing 











































115th Congress not included 
Table E. Statistical Summary of Variables. 
*negative values are transformed into zero as well. This may cause serious distortion in 
data; therefore, other methods of transformation were used to test robustness. The results 
did not change significantly.  
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 국문 초록  
왜 선진국은 개도국에 지속적으로 해외 원조를 조달하는가? 해외 원조는 
비시민에 대한 정부 지출이다. 해외 원조의 수혜자는 국외에 있는 반면, 
해외 원조의 재원은 공여국 국민의 세금으로부터 조달된다. 때문에 
공여국 내에서 해외 원조는 유권자의 관심과 주목을 끄는 정책 이슈가 
아니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 해외 원조는 1990년대 이후 지속적으로 
확대되어 왔으며, 관련 여러 국제 제도가 구축되어 왔다. 본 연구는 
공여국 내에 상당히 약한 정치적 지지를 받고 있는 해외 원조가 오랜 
시간 지속되고, 확대되는 현상에 대해 질문을 제기한다. 
본 논문은 개발 기업의 역할을 중심으로 국내 정치에서 주목 받지 
못하는 해외 원조 이슈가 어떻게 공여국 내에서 정책화되고, 
유지되었는지 탐구한다. 특히, 세계 최대 공여국인 미국의 국내 정치적 
동학에 초점을 둠으로써 해외 원조를 둘러싼 주요 행위자들 간의 
‘순환적 주인 대리인 관계’를 살펴본다. 
본 논문에서 다루는 주요 행위자는 미국의 하원 의원, 
국제개발처 그리고 개발 기업이다. 국제개발처는 미국의 해외 원조를 
담당하는 정부 기관이다. 정부 간의 증여나 차관의 형태로 조달되던 
해외 원조가 점차 프로젝트 형식으로 바뀌며 국제개발처는 국내 개발 
기업과의 계약(조달)을 통해 해외 원조 프로젝트를 실행해 왔고, 이 
계약을 통해 많은 개발 기업들이 성장해 왔다. 즉, 원조 프로젝트를 
수행하는 개발 기업에게 해외 원조는 중요한 성장동력이자 재원이 
된다. 이 개발 기업들은 두 가지 측면에서 해외 원조에 대한 국내 
정치적 지지를 도모하는 데에 중요한 역할을 한다. 첫째, 개발 기업은 
한 선거구의 유권자이다. 때문에 유권자의 이익을 중시하는 의원은 
본인의 지역구에 있는 개발 기업의 이익을 고려하여 지속적으로 해외 
원조 정책을 지지한다. 둘째, 개발 기업은 해외 원조 관련 정책들에 
대한 강한 선호를 가진 특수 이익 집단으로서 의원들에게 국제 개발의 
중요성에 관한 정보를 적극적으로 공유하여 해외 원조의 유지와 
확대에 기여하고 있다. 
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본 연구는 111대부터 115대 미의회의 원조 관련 법안 데이터, 
선거구 수준 정부기관 조달 데이터 그리고 기업 수준 로비 데이터를 
분석하여 다음 두 가지 결론을 제시한다. 첫째, 개발 기업이 집중되어 
있는 선거구의 의원일 수록 해외 원조 법안을 더 적극 지지할 동기가 
커진다. 둘째, 기업과 의원 사이의 로비 접촉은 그 의원의 해외 원조 
법안에 대한 발의 빈도와 양의 상관관계를 갖는다. 본 논문은 앞서 
언급한 세 가지 데이터와 논문, 뉴스기사 그리고 개발 기업이 공개한 
자료를 기반으로 개발 기업이 개별적 로비를 통해 해외 원조 법안을 
지지할 뿐만 아니라, 집단적으로 로비하여 의원들의 지지를 
이끌어내는 데에 일조함을 추론 할 수 있었다. 
본 논문은 개발 기업의 이익 추구가 단순히 개인 기업의 이익으로 
끝나지 않고, 해외 원조에 대한 국내 정치적 지지를 이끌어 내는 데에 
중요한 역할을 수행함을 보여준다. 본 논문은 기존 연구의 국가 수준 
분석을 넘어 국내 정치적 시각에서 해외 원조 정책이 공여국 내에 
유지되고 확대되는 매커니즘을 제시한다는 점에서 의의를 갖는다. 뿐만 
아니라 기존 일방향의 주인-대리인 모델을 수정하여 해외 원조를 둘러싼 
주요 행위자 간 새로운 구조의 대리인 모델을 제시함으로써 기존 연구가 
도외시한 개발 기업의 정치적 역할을 보여준다는 측면에서 의미를 
가진다. 
 
주요어 : 해외 원조, 이익 집단, 국제개발처, 주인-대리인 이론, 로비, 
미국 의회 
학번 : 2016-26629 
